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ABSTRACT 
Moral exclusion refers to a psychological process that removes others from our 
moral community—those whom we treat with fairness and concern for their welfare. 
The present research is concerned with how perceived symbolic threats (threats to the 
ingroup’s values, morals, and worldview) and realistic threats (threats to the ingroup’s 
well-being and resources) are related to moral exclusion. Perceived symbolic and realis-
tic threats from an outgroup (Mexican immigrants) were measured (Study 1) and ma-
nipulated (Study 2) to discover their predictive and causal relationships with moral ex-
clusion. It was found that both symbolic and realistic threats predicted moral exclusion 
and did so uniquely after controlling for prejudice, and that symbolic threat was a caus-
al factor in moral exclusion. Implications of the current research for future studies of 
moral exclusion are discussed, as well as its implications for intergroup relations and 
reducing moral exclusion of outgroups. 
  
This dissertation is approved for recommendation 
to the Graduate Council. 
 
 
 
Dissertation Director: 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
David A. Schroeder 
 
 
Dissertation Committee: 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Denise R. Beike 
 
 
_______________________________________ 
Scott Eidelman 
  
  
DISSERTATION DUPLICATION RELEASE 
 
I hereby authorize the University of Arkansas Libraries to duplicate this thesis when 
needed for research and/or scholarship. 
 
 
Agreed _____________________________________  
  Dana C. Leighton 
 
 
  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The production of this research would not have been possible without the gener-
ous support, guidance, and friendship of Dr. David A. Schroeder. I have benefitted im-
mensely from his deep knowledge, gracious persistence, and unfailing patience. I am 
also indebted to the members of Dr. Schroeder’s research lab—Dennis Poepsel and the 
undergraduate research assistants who contributed to this research: Caitlin Baker, Sa-
vannah E. Clay, Courtney Hollis, Rachel Ricca, and Traci Shelden. 
This research would also not have been possible without the guidance, encour-
agement, and help of the other core social psychology faculty: Dr. Denise R. Beike and 
Dr. Scott Eidelman, and the collegiality of the student and faculty members of the social 
psychology group. 
I am also grateful for the guidance of my previous thesis advisors and mentors: 
Drs. Matthew Prull and Deborah Dunann Winter at Whitman College, and Drs. Mark 
Schaller and Peter Suedfeld at the University of British Columbia. They gave me the 
scholarly foundation upon which the present research is built. 
 I also acknowledge the financial support provided by the University of Arkansas 
Graduate School’s Doctoral Academy Fellowship, Graduate Assistantship, and Travel 
Grants, and the Department of Psychological Science’s Howells fund. This support ena-
bled me to pursue my goals and passion without concern for financial insecurity, a rare 
gift indeed. 
  
DEDICATION 
This dissertation is dedicated to my late father, George E. Leighton, whose com-
mitment to social and environmental justice became a part of my core beliefs and circu-
lates through my research interests. George was a pilot, sailor, engineer, social activist, 
and musician, whose occupation was to help factory workers avoid hearing loss 
through industrial noise control. He urged me to pursue work that would have applica-
tion for, and make a difference in, the lives of people around the world. His generosity 
of spirit for everyone he met, along with his unwavering love for his sons, challenges 
me every day to live with the same depth of love and commitment. 
I would not be the person I am today without my father, but I also owe my life to 
the work of Dr. Lawrence H. Einhorn, whose pioneering and enduring research with 
the use of chemotherapy for metastatic testicular cancer changed the survival rate from 
5% in 1980 to 80% by the time I was diagnosed in 1998. My survival meant I could un-
dertake this research, so I dedicate this dissertation to the spirit of research that helped 
me to survive cancer and live to make a difference in the world. 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction 1 
Overview 2 
Justice and Exclusion 3 
Inclusion and exclusion 4 
The Scope of Justice 4 
Genocide in Rwanda 5 
Structural violence 6 
Delegitimization 7 
Dynamics of the scope of justice 8 
Justice boundaries 9 
A psycho-spatial ordering of justice boundaries 11 
Social centrality 11 
Social capital 13 
Social centrality, social capital, and moral exclusion 14 
Antecedents and Processes of Moral Exclusion 15 
Empirical studies of Deutsch's central questions 16 
Intergroup threat and moral exclusion 18 
Theoretical Approaches to Intergroup Threat 20 
Figure 1 21 
Intergroup threat theory 22 
Symbolic threat 22 
Realistic threat 23 
Consequences of threat 23 
Summary 25 
Conceptual hypotheses 26 
Statement of Problem 27 
  
Experimental context of the present studies 28 
Study 1 29 
Method 29 
Participants 29 
Design 30 
Predictor and criterion variables 30 
Predictor variables 30 
Criterion variables 31 
Control variable 34 
Procedure 35 
Results 35 
Internal Consistency 35 
Bivariate correlations 35 
Table 1 36 
Table 2 38 
Table 3 39 
Regression analysis 40 
IEG  40 
IEG (Mexican Only) 41 
LMES  41 
Table 4 42 
Table 5 43 
Discussion 44 
Table 6 45 
Study 2 47 
Method 48 
Participants 48 
  
Design 48 
Procedure 49 
Results 50 
Preliminary analyses 50 
Table 7 51 
Manipulation check 52 
Analysis of Variance 52 
Table 8 53 
Table 9 54 
Inclusion/Exclusion of Other Groups 55 
Leighton Moral Exclusion Scale 55 
Table 10 56 
Table 11 57 
Table 12 58 
Table 13 59 
Mediation analysis 60 
Discussion 60 
Figure 2 61 
General Discussion 66 
Intergroup Threat Theory 67 
Psychological Processes in Moral Exclusion 69 
Measurement of Moral Exclusion 71 
Future Steps for Research 72 
Practical implications 74 
References 77 
Footnotes 86 
Appendix A 88 
  
Appendix B 89 
Appendix C 90 
Appendix D 92 
Appendix E 93 
Appendix F 94 
Appendix G 95 
Appendix H 96 
Appendix I 97 
  1 
Introduction 
Whenever our ethnic or national prejudices are aroused, in times of scarcity, dur-
ing challenges to national self-esteem…habits of thought familiar from ages past 
reach for the controls.… Darkness gathers. The demons begin to stir. (Sagan, 
1996, pp. 26–27) 
 
I asked a friend recently what I should write for an introduction to a paper that 
concerns, in part, the social psychological processes involved in genocide. She suggest-
ed to start with “Once upon a time…” “Okay,” I replied, “once upon a time there was 
no genocide. Then people formed groups.” 
That trite response has a ring of truth; intergroup relations are at the heart of 
genocide. The systematic elimination or mass murder of people based only on their 
group membership has been a serious problem since European expansion and is sus-
pected in Mesolithic populations over 5,000 years ago (Kiernan, 2007). Old Testament 
texts instructed “thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth: but thou shalt utterly de-
stroy them—the Hittites, Amorites, Canaanites…” (Deuteronomy 20:16–17 King James 
Version). 
Genocide and war are extreme versions of intergroup conflict, but there are less 
extreme versions, including ethnopolitical conflict, religious bigotry, political polariza-
tion, and anti-immigrant prejudice. In the more extreme versions, violence is direct: 
people are subject to violence perpetrated on them directly; in the less extreme versions, 
the violence is indirect, often manifesting as deprivations of economic or psychological 
welfare. These deprivations, when perpetrated by (and justified through) social struc-
tures and institutions, are referred to as “structural violence” (Galtung, 1969; Winter & 
Leighton, 2001). In the case of intergroup direct and structural violence, a common psy-
chological process is treatment of individuals based on intergroup differentiation and 
categorization. The importance of intergroup processes in structural violence was eluci-
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dated by the European Union’s Copenhagen Summit for Social Development, which 
advocates for recognition and representation of all groups and just redistributions to 
help prevent social disintegration on the basis of social identity (Wiman, 2009). 
Structural violence is often perpetrated by a dominant majority population that 
holds power over distribution of resources and other social goods, and targeted toward 
a marginalized minority population that has relatively little power or ability to affect 
these distributions. The majority population, occupying and controlling the center of 
power structures in the society, can make laws and create the conditions for the exploi-
tation of the minority. The minority usually has neither the resources nor access to polit-
ical power needed to make changes in the political or economic system that is managed 
by the majority. This situation often leads to the minority being excluded from access to 
resources, denied welfare, and not considered to be entitled to fairness—three condi-
tions collectively known as moral exclusion from the scope of justice (Opotow, 1988, 
1990a, 1990b). 
Overview  
The present research is intended to better understand the antecedents and psy-
chological factors that are involved in the perpetration of moral exclusion of outgroup 
members. It will discuss the general concepts of the moral community (Deutsch, 1974, 
1975), moral exclusion (Deutsch, 1985), and the scope of justice (Opotow, 1988, 1990a, 
1990b), and their relationship to intergroup relations. The experimental procedures, 
measures, and context of the present studies will be described, followed by results and 
discussion. Finally, a general discussion will discuss the results in combination and dis-
cuss implications of the present research for studies of moral exclusion and for inter-
group relations in the context of moral exclusion. 
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Justice and Exclusion 
Morton Deutsch was the first psychologist to propose the notion of moral exclu-
sion, and he did so in the context of what bases are used for allocations in distributive 
justice (i.e., equity, equality, need). He suggested that justice is granted only to those 
with whom we have at least a minimal degree of cooperation, and that relations with 
individuals who fall outside the bounds of our “moral community” are not considered 
part of our justice concerns (Deutsch, 1974, 1975, 1985). 
Theories of distributive justice have generally assumed the distribution will oc-
cur within groups (Cohen, 1991; Deutsch, 1975; Wenzel, 2001; Wenzel, 2009), whereas 
moral exclusion theory is concerned more with the justice of allocations to outgroups. 
More specifically, moral exclusion is the denial of resources, welfare, and fairness from 
groups who are considered different, abhorrent, or expendable. Such groups are likely 
to be composed of outgroup members, but some outgroups may originate as members 
within an ingroup and, because of some arbitrary criteria, are then categorized as devi-
ants or outsiders, excluded from justice, and deprived of the just deserts that are ex-
pected for other ingroup members. Whether done at the intragroup or intergroup level, 
those to whom we apply differential standards of fairness are placed more or less with-
in our justice boundary. People easily include themselves and ingroup members within 
their justice boundaries and can easily exclude others. For example, basketball fans 
might easily derogate the visiting team’s players, while being upset if their own team’s 
players were derogated by visiting fans. 
Those who are perceived to be outside one’s moral community can be excluded 
from considerations of fair treatment and fair outcomes (Deutsch, 2006) and therefore 
excluded from one’s scope of justice. This exclusion process is referred to by Deutsch as 
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a moral exclusion, whereby others are excluded from the moral community through a 
contraction of the scope of justice: 
Justice is not involved in relations with others—such as heathens, “inferior races,” 
heretics, “perverts”—who are perceived to be outside one's potential moral com-
munity or opposed to it. An implication of this line of reasoning is that the nar-
rower one's conception of one's community, the narrower will be the scope of sit-
uations in which one's actions will be governed by considerations of justice 
(Deutsch, 1985, pp. 36–37). 
 
Inclusion and exclusion. Generally speaking, justice is marked by outcomes and 
treatment that are fair in relation to the other individuals in the scope of justice 
(Deutsch, 2006). At an interpersonal and intergroup level, this might be manifested in 
such things as prosocial behavior, inclusion of those from marginalized social or spatial 
regions, inclusion in procedural justice, and allocation of social resources (Opotow, Ger-
son, & Woodside, 2005). 
Moral exclusion implies that those outside the scope of justice may be denied the 
standards of fair treatment that apply to those within the scope of justice. Those exclud-
ed are outside the boundary of justice. Thus, they may not be seen as entitled to distrib-
utive or procedural justice, resources and social goods may be withheld from them, and 
their well-being may be of little or no concern. In fact, in extreme cases of moral exclu-
sion, active harm or death may be justified and acceptable as in the case of genocide 
(Staub, 1989). 
The Scope of Justice 
Some review of the terms used thus far is in order to help clarify the objects, op-
erators, and processes involved in moral exclusion. The moral community is the group 
of individuals with whom an individual shares some amount of cooperation and to 
whom distributive justice is applied in the form of fair treatment and outcomes 
(Deutsch, 1974, 1975, 1985, 2006). The scope of justice is a representation of the psycho-
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logical boundary delineating those who are inside and outside of our moral community 
(Deutsch, 1974, 1985; Opotow, 1988, 1990a, 1990b). Moral exclusion refers to the psycho-
logical processes by which individuals or groups are excluded from one’s moral com-
munity and kept outside the scope of justice (Opotow, 1990b). 
A reasonable metaphor for the scope of justice is a child’s sandbox. The child 
may allow many other children to play in the sandbox, while sharing the sand, toys, 
and camaraderie equally with these children. There may be other children outside the 
sandbox whom the child excludes from the sandbox. The children inside the box may 
subtly or forcefully keep those outside the sandbox from sharing the sand, toys, and 
camaraderie. The children inside the box might one day arbitrarily decide that red-
haired children no longer can play in the sandbox. All red-haired children will be 
pushed outside the sandbox, excluded from reentry, without concern for their welfare 
or happiness. The red-haired children would now be morally excluded by the children 
in the sandbox: no longer part of the distributive justice of the moral community, placed 
outside the scope of justice, and prevented from accessing its resources and opportuni-
ties. 
In this sandbox example, the criterion for moral exclusion from the scope of jus-
tice is red hair, a tangible characteristic of the individual. Sometimes, the criterion for 
moral exclusion is made by an intangible aspect of an individual’s perception of another 
person; this intangible aspect provides the basis for moral exclusion through social cat-
egorization. A horrifying example of this social categorization process leading to moral 
exclusion comes from the central African country of Rwanda. 
Genocide in Rwanda. In 1994, a genocide occurred in Rwanda that resulted in 
the deaths of at least a half million, and likely about 800,000 individuals (Eltringham, 
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2004). The basis for the genocide, perpetrated by the majority ruling Hutu population, 
was the victims’ identification as members of the minority Tutsi population. The Hutus 
and Tutsis are ethnically the same: they share a common language, religious practices, 
eat the same foods, and live intermingled with each other. Although there were some 
physiological characteristics that the Hutus used as stereotypes in seeking out Tutsis for 
extermination, for the most part the identification as Tutsi or Hutu was made on the ba-
sis of stated ethnicity on national identification cards, government-issued lists, or hav-
ing their names and locations read out on state-controlled radio. In pre-genocide 
Rwanda, the designations of Hutu and Tutsi took on the strength of racial markers of 
social categorization; thus stigmatized, the Tutsis became enemies of the Hutus.1 
Thus, the Hutus in Rwanda “saw” the mostly intangible Tutsi “race” of their 
former friends and neighbors, categorized them as enemies, morally excluded them 
from the scope of justice, and proceeded to murder them. The Hutu’s scope of justice, 
once encompassing their Tutsi neighbors, contracted, thus excluding the Tutsis. This 
example is one of extreme moral exclusion, as it resulted in genocide, a form of direct 
violence (Wagner, 2001). 
Structural violence. Moral exclusion often takes more subtle, but still damaging, 
forms that Deutsch refers to as “marginalization,” preventing those excluded from “full 
participation in the political, economic, and social life of their societies” (2006, p. 53). 
This more subtle form of exclusion would characterize structural violence, and is seen 
in the United States and other societies as a variety of laws that exclude certain groups 
from full participation in civil and economic life. 
An example of structural violence and the moral exclusion process comes from 
U. S. history and helps further illustrate the role of social categorization in moral exclu-
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sion. In the 1886 United States v. Kagama court case, Native Americans were defined as 
excluded from the equal membership in the moral community of non-Native Ameri-
cans (Stumpf, 2004). In this case, Native Americans became subject to federal plenary 
authority, which meant that the federal government had exclusive power over them 
and their constitutional protections were removed. Three years later the court extended 
this exclusion to Chinese permanent residents. In both of these cases, the exclusion was 
made on the basis of category membership, describing the Native Americans as a race 
that is weak and childlike and Chinese residents as aberrant strangers and separate 
from the moral community. This example illustrates a form of moral exclusion that has 
been described as “delegitimization” (Bar-Tal, 1989).  
Delegitimization. Delegitimization is a cognitive process whereby differentia-
tion is used via social categorization to assign groups to stigmatized social categories 
that are associated with extremely negative attributes (measured by social norms and 
values of the delegitimizing group) and that may even be perceived as less human (Bar-
Tal, 1989; Kelman, 2001). It is also an affective process, accompanied by intense emo-
tions indicative of fear, rejection, or contempt. 
This constellation of features makes delegitimization dangerous because it also 
has a behavioral component, whereby harming the delegitimized group could be used 
to avert some perceived threat and to justify the delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1990). For 
example, Latin American military officers justified use of torture against radicals and 
suspected guerillas on the basis that they represented a threat to the state (Heinz, 1995, 
as cited in Kelman, 2001). In general, once the differentiation is made and outgroup is 
delegitimized, the delegitimizing ingroup members will seek out information that sup-
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ports the differentiation. This “freezing” (Bar-Tal, 1989; Bar-Tal & Geva, 1986) of the 
categorization helps maintain the delegitimized group in a state of moral exclusion. 
Dynamics of the scope of justice. The scope of justice is malleable and contracts 
or expands in response to social categorization processes and contextual factors, includ-
ing intergroup processes, threat, authoritarianism, ideology, and conflict (e.g., Corneille, 
Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Buidin, 2001; Deutsch, 2006; Halperin, Pedahzur, & Canetti-Nisim, 
2007; Maoz & McCauley, 2008; McLaren, 2003; Miron, Branscombe, & Biernat, 2010; 
Passini, 2008; Quillian, 1995; Schwartz, 2007; Wenzel, 2004). The breadth of one’s scope 
of justice is often based on social norms and personal dispositions (Opotow, 2008), but it 
expands and contracts in response to situational and social psychological influences (see 
Opotow, 1988). For example, conflict may contract the boundaries of the scope of jus-
tice, as resource allocation decisions are made more on self-interest (or group interest) 
than on more universal considerations of well-being (Opotow, 2008). Thus those who 
might previously be our friends and neighbors may become enemies. 
As others move out of the category of “friend” into the category of “enemy,” 
they are moved outside the scope of justice, and “normal” moral rules and social norms 
can be ignored in our relations with them. As conflict intensifies or becomes intractable, 
those morally excluded are subject to delegitimization (Bar-Tal, 1989), and harming 
them becomes justified. As in the example of the Rwandan genocide, those who were 
formerly “friends” may become recategorized as “enemies,” setting the stage for moral 
exclusion, harm, and death. Conversely, the end of wars can stimulate the emergence of 
peacebuilding and inclusion as members of society seek to rebuild their society and 
form cooperative relationships with those previously considered enemies. Those previ-
ously excluded from the scope of justice are extended fairness considerations and allo-
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cated resources to rebuild. This new, inclusive relationship may engender self-sacrifice 
by former enemies to foster each others’ well-being. 
To summarize, within the scope of justice, treatment of others is consistent with 
fairness, equitable allocation of resources, and sacrifice of individual well-being to help 
foster the well-being of others (Opotow, 2008). Social categorization enables the percep-
tion of intergroup differences and intergroup differentiation. Motivated by threat or 
ideological zeal, the boundary of the scope of justice might be drawn closer to the in-
group, resulting in outgroups being more excluded from the scope of justice. Placing 
other groups outside the scope of justice allows denial of distributive or procedural jus-
tice, resources, welfare, and, in extreme forms, facilitates harm or death. Bringing out-
groups into the scope of justice potentiates the building of inclusive social relations that 
can lead to the fostering of human welfare. 
Justice boundaries. The scope of justice is a psychological boundary between 
those to whom justice is or is not applied. These boundaries are contextual and located 
in accord with social norms and social categorization processes (Opotow, 1990b; Wen-
zel, 2001). Social norms within cultures may denote those entitled to justice concerns. 
For example, when considering the justice of wages, one might consider it unjust for a 
fellow co-worker to be unpaid for his or her labor, while one’s spouse might work in his 
or her household for no pay. Those violating an ingroup’s social norms might be ex-
cluded from the scope of justice because norm violations represent a threat to group 
identity (Huo, 2002). 
Justice boundaries might also be formed based on social categorization processes. 
Social categorizations are divisions of a complex social world into subdivisions, which 
individuals use to locate themselves and others as part of a social system (Oakes, 1996; 
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Turner, 1982). Social categorization allows us to include ourselves and others within 
certain groups, and exclude ourselves and others from certain groups. Entitlement to, or 
exclusion from, justice can be made based on these social categorizations, especially if 
group memberships are made salient (Wenzel, 2001).  
An example of justice boundaries lies in the differential justice often applied to-
ward humans and other organisms. Although one might consider taking another hu-
man life unjust, heinous, or morally reprehensible, one might squash a cockroach run-
ning across the kitchen floor and feel no sense of injustice doing so. Cattle, pigs, chick-
ens, and other livestock are a part of many people’s diet, outside the boundary of justice 
concerns, and thus morally excluded from the scope of justice that might preclude their 
killing. These examples illustrate that humans have some intrinsic properties that make 
their killing indefensible, while the cockroach has certain intrinsic properties that make 
the killing less reprehensible or even desirable. These properties allow us to categorize 
the cockroach as “vermin,” thus allowing it to be placed outside the scope of justice that 
protects humans. Similarly, seeing livestock as foodstuff might make their killing more 
feasible as they have some properties that make their killing justifiable, yet a child who 
names his or her pet pig “Sally” might see Sally’s slaughter as a gross violation of jus-
tice; other pigs are categorized as food, but Sally is categorized as pet. 
The foregoing helps illustrate the complex contextual and categorization pro-
cesses inherent in justice boundaries. Insects and animals can be categorized differently 
from humans and from each other. Killing animals or insects might be contextually jus-
tified: Killing a chicken outside the context of food provision might be considered un-
just, while it might be just to slaughter a chicken for food, and killing a cockroach in my 
kitchen might be more easily justified than when encountered on a sidewalk. In terms 
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of justice boundaries with other people, there are likely analogous social categorization 
and contextual processes at work in moral exclusion from the scope of justice. 
A Psycho-spatial Ordering of Justice Boundaries 
The concept of justice boundaries conjures notions of spatial relations. There is a 
bounded area, the scope of justice, where justice principles are applied, distributive jus-
tice is allocated, and individuals and groups are recipients of justice. The notion of a 
scope of justice implies a perceptual process; we see what is in the scope of our vision. 
Those outside the bounded area are not seen as part of the moral community and thus 
not entitled to justice. Thus, there is likely a psycho-spatial process active in moral ex-
clusion, where we perceive outgroups as being spatially ordered in our moral universe; 
some are within the scope of justice, others outside it. 
Sociology theory provides two useful concepts in describing this psycho-spatial 
relationship: social capital and social centrality. Both of these concepts are useful in under-
standing how we might spatially order our ingroup and outgroups within our moral 
universe, either including outgroups in the scope of justice or excluding them from it. 
Social centrality. Social centrality is the notion that social relations have and are 
influenced by spatial characteristics. In terms of the scope of justice, an individual or 
group may be more or less central to (or included in) justice allocations. Much of this 
“social spatialization” (Shields, 1991, p. 31) concept springs from the writing of Henri 
Lefebvre in his criticisms of capitalism and the socio-spatial relations of urban centers. 
He proposed that the power that maintains dependence and exploitation in a society is 
ubiquitous, in such forms as a society’s norms, art, commerce, and institutions 
(Lefebvre, 1976). This relationship represents the social “relations of production” 
(Lefebvre, 1976, p. 8) whereby a capitalist system maintains itself. Spatially, this concept 
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is represented by segregated residential and business districts; cities often have “finan-
cial centers” and “industrial centers,” as well as suburbs and slums. Social goods and 
resources are distributed unequally, and sometimes inequitably, across these areas. 
When abstracted to social relations, power in a society is often parceled out based on 
hierarchical relationships between the powerful and the marginalized; the powerful are 
at the centers of power, while those marginalized are often at the periphery, denied the 
social power to change the unjust distribution of social goods and resources. 
Social centrality, then, is inherent in the concept of moral inclusion in the scope 
of justice. Social power might be seen as a series of concentric circles, where the inner-
most circle has the most social power and control of distribution of tangible and intan-
gible goods, while the outermost circles are marginalized populations which are recipi-
ents of the distribution and thereby vulnerable to domination and exploitation. Distrib-
utive justice requires that individuals or group members have access to allocation of re-
sources, which is often done hierarchically from the centers of social power to those on 
the periphery of social power. In such cases, inclusion in the scope of justice requires a 
cross-cutting of hierarchical, power-mediated distribution systems. Ingroup member-
ship might exist “horizontally” within these concentric bands of social power; mutual 
acquaintances are often drawn from those with similar levels of social power.  
Consolidating the concentric circles would involve the decentralization and dis-
tribution of power such that all members have full access to the tangible and intangible 
goods that are part of the distributive justice system, representing full moral inclusion 
in the scope of justice. Shifting from concentric circles to intersecting ones emphasizes 
relational aspects of identity (Diani, 2000), making salient the interdependence of social 
relations and perhaps enabling access to power by those groups that were previously 
subject to exclusion. As formerly excluded groups gain the social power to change the 
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distribution of social goods, these groups would become more morally included. Access 
to social power by marginalized groups depends on the disintegration of these concen-
tric circles of power and the integration of all groups within the distribution of power. 
Moral exclusion of outgroups might be used as a way to reinforce social centrality by 
denying access to social power and controlling its distribution. 
Social capital. Social capital is a sociological concept that represents the value of 
social networks or other social structures in helping individuals gain access to the bene-
fits of membership in a community (Portes, 1998). Social capital is often conceptualized 
as the level of trust between individuals, groups, or institutions (e.g., Uslaner, 2002), 
and recent experimental research shows that participants judge others as being more 
trustworthy if the participant is from a group toward whom the participant shows fa-
vorable racial bias as measured by the Implicit Associations Test (Stanley, Sokol-
Hessner, Banaji, & Phelps, 2011), a demonstration of group-based social capital.  
Social capital is obtained by a recipient as a product of the trust extended toward 
him or her by others; these trusting relationships are the source of the capital. The dis-
position of others to engage in trusting relationships provides social capital to those 
within one’s own community, which is referred to as “bounded solidarity” (Portes, 
1998, p. 8). This ingroup solidarity is an important factor in social capital, and often 
provides benefits in the form of a basis for reciprocity norms, social and economic sup-
port within communities, and feelings of solidarity. This solidarity is referred to as 
“bonding” social capital, through which people are bonded via a shared social identity 
(Putnam, 2000; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004).  
Bonding social capital has been proposed to be a way groups provide mobility 
and resources to their members through support from within their ingroups. For exam-
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ple, whereas members of minority groups might not be able to obtain loans for business 
development from a dominant majority, they might receive loans from within the mi-
nority community. But the same benefits members of a group accrue through bonding 
social capital potentiate the exclusion of those outside the group from accessing that 
same social capital. 
“Bridging” social capital is a second form of social capital that allows access to 
assets and information that might not otherwise be available within a community 
through relationships with others with a dissimilar social identity (Putnam, 2000; Szre-
ter & Woolcock, 2004). This access comes in the form of intergroup “weak ties” to mem-
bers of groups outside one’s ingroup and improves information flow, provides job ac-
cess, and facilitates political organization and integration (Granovetter, 1983). Bridging 
social capital is important because it is a way for marginalized groups to access re-
sources and power that may be held by dominant groups. 
A recent refinement of social capital theory concerns the relationships across ex-
plicit, formalized power and authority differentials present in social institutions such as 
those between students and teachers, patients and doctors, and citizens and police; this 
has been termed “linking” social capital (Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). It represents the 
social norms and trusting relations that allow the flow of power, resources, and recipro-
cal trust between these institutions and those over whom they have power. Especially 
for those in poor communities, linking social capital has a major effect on welfare (Szre-
ter & Woolcock, 2004). Thus, moral inclusion might be predicated on the willingness of 
an ingroup to extend bridging and linking social capital to an outgroup. 
Social centrality, social capital, and moral exclusion. The theories of social cen-
trality and social capital seem to be closely related to the concept of moral exclusion. For 
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example, a society with high social centrality would imply that a dominant ingroup 
controls a society’s power, such as political office and resources for business and eco-
nomic development. At the individual level, moral exclusion would represent the desire 
by a member of a dominant ingroup to not grant a minority outgroup access to political 
power and economic resources. Individuals who support social centrality would be 
more likely to engage in moral exclusion, and measurement of an individual’s attitude 
regarding social centrality at the intergroup level should be a good measure of moral 
exclusion. 
Moral inclusion, on the other hand, might represent a willingness to decentralize 
the social power by distributing it to the outgroup. This process might be facilitated by 
the trusting relationships developed as part of bridging and linking social capital as so-
cial power and resources flow across group boundaries, cross-cutting the hierarchical 
power structures that are characteristic of social centrality. Thus, individuals who sup-
port bridging and linking social capital with an outgroup should be more morally in-
clusive. Measurement of social centrality and social capital could be useful in establish-
ing an individual’s level of moral exclusion of an outgroup. 
Antecedents and Processes of Moral Exclusion 
As has been explained earlier, social categorization is paramount in the moral ex-
clusion process. But Deutsch (2006) also makes the important point that the scope of jus-
tice is malleable and situationally influenced: justice is allocated to others differentially 
as a function of both social categorization and the social situation. Those who might, 
under some conditions, be perceived as within the scope of justice may, under other 
conditions, be moved outside the scope of justice. Following from this social psycholog-
ical conception of the scope of justice, Deutsch (2006) proposes three questions central 
to understanding moral exclusion: (a) what are the social conditions leading to it, (b) 
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what psychological processes play a role in it, and (c) who is most likely selected as a 
target for exclusion?  
Among social conditions, he proposes increases in relative deprivation, political 
instability, superiority claims, culturally salient violence, little cooperative contact be-
tween excluder and excluded, authoritarian social institutions, and lack of observers 
and objectors to exclusion. He proposes psychological mechanisms that help justify exclu-
sion such as appeals to higher moral orders, relabeling exclusion as helpful, minimizing 
exclusion’s impacts, denying personal responsibility, blaming the victim, and becoming 
emotionally isolated from, and desensitized to, the victim’s plight. Targets of the exclu-
sion are those who are suppressing inner conflicts, those whose behavior deviates from 
norms, those who are members of low-power groups, and those who are perceived as 
threats. 
Empirical studies of Deutsch's central questions. Several studies have recently 
examined moral exclusion from the perspective of some of the factors enumerated in 
Deutch’s (2006) central questions, specifically relative deprivation, authoritarian social 
institutions, minimizing exclusion’s impacts on those excluded, and intergroup threat. 
For example, in a study of Australian tax cheating behavior, participants were induced 
to think of their group membership as Australians, but also as members of their work or 
occupational category, and asked to rate their tax burden relative to other occupational 
groups (Wenzel, 2004). Only those with both high occupational group identification and 
high national group identification showed concern for their occupational group relative 
to other occupational groups. This study reflects on Deutsch’s relative deprivation hy-
pothesis in that concern for the ingroup’s burden relative to outgroups requires both 
identification with the ingroup but also identification with a superordinate group. In 
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other words, in order to form a scope of justice that includes one’s own subgroup but 
excludes other subgroups of the same superordinate group, identification with the su-
perordinate group and subgroup must both be strong. This kind of process might be 
seen in white supremacist organizations in the United States; they often display Ameri-
can flags and Christianity symbols, which might invoke a strong superordinate identity, 
while rhetoric and other symbols simultaneously invoke a strong white supremacy 
subgroup identity. The result is moral inclusion of Americans who are White, and mor-
al exclusion of Americans who are non-White. 
Group identification also seems to be active in how individuals justify moral ex-
clusion through minimizing the impact of exclusion on an outgroup. This was tested in a 
study of collective guilt for past injustices done by the ingroup to an outgroup (Miron et 
al., 2010). Participants in these studies (American undergraduates) read a passage de-
scribing damage and death resulting from enslavement of Africans by Americans and 
completed questionnaires regarding judgment of harm done to Africans, how much in-
justice had to be perpetrated upon Africans to qualify the United States as a racist na-
tion (standards of injustice), and collective guilt for treatment of African Americans. In-
group identification as Americans correlated positively with standards of injustice and 
negatively with perception of harm. Further, a causal path was found where group 
identification’s effects on reduced collective guilt was fully mediated through higher 
injustice standards and lower perception of harm. Thus, psychologically minimizing the 
impact that moral exclusion has on an outgroup could serve to reduce collective in-
group guilt, justifying the perpetuation of moral exclusion. 
Deutsch (2006) also proposed that authoritarian social institutions are a social con-
dition leading to moral exclusion. Supporting this idea are data showing that egalitarian 
and democratized social structures are related to moral inclusion. As part of a study of 
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universalism values and moral inclusion, the level of democratization, egalitarianism, 
and moral inclusion were rated in each of 66 countries (Schwartz, 2007, Study 2). The 
data showed that democratization and egalitarianism were positively correlated with 
moral inclusion. Because modern liberal democracy is associated with more pluralistic 
and less authoritarian political structures (Dahl, 1998; Mouffe, 1996), this finding sup-
ports Deutch’s (2006) proposal. 
Intergroup threat and moral exclusion. While most of the factors that Deutsch 
(2006) identified as central to moral exclusion have received little or no attention, a no-
table exception is perception of intergroup threat, which has been found to have a direct 
and mediating effect on social perception and moral exclusion. For example, threats 
from an outgroup were shown to lead to exaggerated perceptions of both consensus 
among outgroup members and the extremity of positions held by them (Corneille et al., 
2001). Perception of intergroup threat was also found to mediate the relationship be-
tween moral exclusion and antipathy toward foreigners held by East German youth 
(Watts, 1996). Perceived intergroup threat also mediated the relationship between 
hawkish ideology and moral exclusion of Arabs by Israelis (Maoz & McCauley, 2008).  
Intergroup threats perceived by a dominant group are among the best predictors 
of exclusionary attitudes and prejudice, particularly in the context of a relatively large 
minority population (McLaren, 2003; Quillian, 1995). Perceived economic and cultural 
threat was also found to mediate the relationship between level of education and social 
distance perceived by Israelis toward minority groups in Israel (Halperin et al., 2007). 
Social distance (Bogardus, 1928, 1933, 1959) measures the propensity for an individual 
to accept an outgroup member as a member of the individual’s family, occupation, 
community, and world and is conceptually related to moral exclusion (Passini, 2008). 
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Perceived intergroup threat has also been shown in two studies to mediate the 
relationship between authoritarianism and moral exclusion. Using an adapted right-
wing authoritarianism scale that differentiated between aggressive, submissive, and 
conventional authoritarianism, it was shown that aggressive and conventional authori-
tarianism predicted moral exclusion, an effect mediated by perceived threat (Passini, 
2008). A recent study of perception of Arab threat among Gaza strip settlers in Israel 
demonstrated that perceived intergroup threat indirectly mediated the relationship be-
tween right-wing authoritarianism and moral exclusion, and that perceived threat was 
the strongest predictor of moral exclusion (Canetti, Halperin, Hobfoll, Shapira, & 
Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009). 
This collection of research on perceived threat and moral exclusion demonstrates 
that an ingroup’s perception of threat posed by an outgroup has profound effects on 
social perception and moral exclusion (Corneille et al., 2001; McLaren, 2003; Quillian, 
1995; Watts, 1996). In addition, these effects work in concert with other individual dif-
ference factors such as authoritarianism, ideology, affect, and education (Canetti et al., 
2009; Halperin et al., 2007; Maoz & McCauley, 2008; Passini, 2008). Because it has 
demonstrated powerful effects on moral exclusion in a number of different studies con-
ducted in different social and cultural contexts, it is important to understand the dimen-
sions of intergroup threat that affect moral exclusion. 
Previous studies of prejudice and intergroup attitudes related to moral exclusion 
have used perceived threat to cultural values, or conflated cultural and economic 
threats, so it is not clear whether perceived cultural threat or economic threat is a 
stronger predictor or more likely to lead to moral exclusion. For example, perceived 
threat to cultural values was used in one study (i.e., Corneille et al., 2001), and a com-
bined cultural and economic/well-being threat was used in some others (Canetti et al., 
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2009; Halperin et al., 2007; Passini, 2008; i.e., Watts, 1996). Only one study has included 
both cultural and economic/well-being threat as independent predictors (McLaren, 
2003).2 Only one study has used perceived threats to directly predict moral exclusion 
(i.e., Passini, 2008), and none has experimentally tested the effects of these threats on 
moral exclusion. 
Theoretical Approaches to Intergroup Threat 
As indicated earlier, the study of moral exclusion is relatively new and there has 
been virtually no research on the direct effects of perceived threat on moral exclusion. 
Several studies have shown perceived economic and cultural threat to be related to 
prejudice and attitudes related to moral exclusion. For this reason, the present research 
proceeds from a theoretical model of intergroup threat that includes analogues of both 
economic threat and cultural threat: realistic threat and symbolic threat. 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, Walter and Cookie Stephan began exploring the ef-
fects that fear and ignorance might have on prejudice (Stephan, 1984, 1985). They de-
veloped research on two forms of threat that might be causes of prejudice: intergroup 
anxiety and negative stereotypes. Soon thereafter, other researchers (e.g., Bobo, 1988; 
Sears, 1988) were working from realistic conflict theory and symbolic racism theory to 
develop an understanding of the ways realistic threats and symbolic threats affect preju-
dice. Attempting to bring together these four forms of threat into a comprehensive 
model, Stephan and Stephan (2000) developed integrated threat theory (Figure 1). This 
theory provided a framework for understanding how factors such as ingroup identifica-
tion, intergroup contact and conflict, relative group status, etc. contribute to the four 
types of threat and affect intergroup attitudes. 
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Figure 1. Integrated Threat Theory. Adapted from Stephan and Stephan (2000). 
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Intergroup threat theory. Further research and refinement of integrated threat 
theory established that negative stereotypes are a cause of both realistic and symbolic 
threats, and that intergroup anxiety was a subtype of threat (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morri-
son, 2009). As a result, integrated threat theory was revised to focus on perceived realis-
tic and symbolic threats as sources of intergroup prejudice.  
The revised theory, intergroup threat theory (ITT; Stephan et al., 2009), differen-
tiated between threats related to the ingroup as a whole and threats to specific individ-
uals. Group symbolic threat refers to threats to the group’s religion, values, beliefs, ide-
ology, and worldview. Individual symbolic threat refers to threats to the individual’s 
self-esteem, self-identity, or honor. Group realistic threat refers to threats to the in-
group’s power, resources, and group well-being. Individual realistic threat refers to 
threats to the individual’s health, personal security, or material resources. 
Symbolic threat. At the group level, symbolic threats are threats that an out-
group poses to the ingroup’s core values, morals, beliefs, attitudes, and norms (Stephan 
& Stephan, 2000). ITT proposes that these threats arise, in part, because the ingroup 
members believe their system of values is morally right. Although symbolic threats are 
part of many prominent social psychology theories (e.g., symbolic racism, social domi-
nance theory, ambivalence-amplification theory, etc.), these theories differ from ITT in 
two important ways (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). First, other theories often conceptualize 
perceived threat to an ingroup’s values as a form of prejudice (Bobo, 1988), making 
threat indistinguishable from prejudice. ITT conceptualizes perceived threat as a cause 
of prejudice. Second, these other theoretical approaches have sometimes combined 
symbolic and realistic threats in their measurements, thus making the distinction un-
clear. For example, the symbolic racism scale includes outgroup gains in political power 
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as a symbolic threat (Bobo, 1983). Threats to the dominant group’s power are better 
aligned with realistic threat, because power is not a value, belief, or moral position, but 
rather a resource the dominant group uses to its advantage. 
Realistic threat. Group realistic threats are threats to the ingroup’s instrumental 
interests, particularly the ingroup’s resources, power, status, and welfare (Bobo, 1988; 
Stephan, 2000, 2009). The concept of realistic threat derives from realistic group conflict 
theory (RGCT; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif, 1966), but the conception of threat un-
der RGCT is different from that under ITT. RGCT limited itself to competition for scarce 
resources, whereas ITT’s conception of realistic threat is broader, encompassing re-
sources such as power and status and also by including group well-being as part of re-
alistic threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). In addition, RGCT dealt with more objective 
threats, whereas ITT’s conception of realistic threat is based in the individual’s subjec-
tive perceptions of realistic threat. Ingroup members may infer realistic threats that are 
not actually present, and these perceptions are important regardless of the objective 
presence of threats. 
Consequences of threat. As intergroup threat increases, ethnocentrism, intoler-
ance, opposition to policies favoring the outgroup, condoning more extreme behaviors 
to protect the ingroup, and justification of violence against the outgroup are likely cog-
nitive outcomes of perceived threat (Stephan et al., 2009). As threat increases, it is also 
likely that emotional outcomes will also contribute to the likelihood of moral exclusion. 
Fear, anger, resentment, contempt, and disgust have been observed in empirical studies 
of threat (Stephan et al., 2009). To the degree that these emotions are experienced as 
group-based emotions toward an outgroup, they could lead to moral exclusion or harm 
of outgroup members. In fact, group-based anger mediates the relationship between in-
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group collective support and offensive behavioral tendencies toward an outgroup 
(Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). 
ITT proposes that intergroup threat is leads to behavioral outcomes such as “po-
licing of intergroup boundaries” (Stephan et al., 2009, p. 52), whereby inclusion or ex-
clusion of members is made on increasingly strict criteria. Threats to an ingroup’s core 
values via a deviant ingroup member have been shown to trigger exclusion of the devi-
ant from the ingroup’s boundary as a way of neutralizing this symbolic threat to the in-
group (Eidelman, Silvia, & Biernat, 2006). This exclusion is a direct analogue to moral 
exclusion and removal from the scope of justice that might result from perceived sym-
bolic threats from an outgroup. 
According to ITT, symbolic threats are predicted to be especially likely to elicit 
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses that would lead to moral exclusion, de-
humanization, and delegitimization (Stephan et al., 2009). This is because symbolic 
threats jeopardize the ingroup’s core values and, in that sense, the existence and cohe-
sion of the ingroup, and so may engender fervent responses to neutralize the threat. In 
contrast, realistic threats might be more associated with pragmatic, coping-based re-
sponses to the threat (Stephan et al., 2009). This is because an outgroup’s access to an 
ingroup’s resources can be negotiated, especially if the ingroup is in a dominant power 
position. 
In the face of symbolic threat, there may be no possible negotiation or middle-
ground where a group’s core values are concerned; thus, the only way to neutralize the 
threat is through moral exclusion. The non-negotiable nature of symbolic conflict would 
make it a form of zero-sum conflict, where the core values will be “ours” or “theirs,” 
and “winning” requires the exclusion or elimination of the outgroup to preserve the in-
group’s core values. A recent test of the effects of zero-sum intergroup conflict on moral 
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exclusion showed that when the concerns of an ingroup conflict with the concerns of 
the outgroup, and the conflict is zero-sum, then ingroup members devalue outgroup 
members and prefer certain loss of outgroup lives over possible losses of ingroup lives 
(Pratto & Glasford, 2008). 
Summary 
Justice is a process whereby individuals and groups engaged in exchange rela-
tions are ensured treatment that is fair in relation to others in the exchange relationship 
(Deutsch, 2006). Those to whom individuals apply justice principles are considered to 
be within the individual’s moral community, a psycho-spatial region bounded by the 
scope of justice. Moral exclusion occurs when the scope of justice is drawn close to the 
individual or the ingroup, so that others are excluded from the moral community (Opo-
tow, 1990b). When others are morally excluded, considerations of fairness do not apply, 
and allocations of resources and self-sacrifice are not made on their behalf. They can be 
denied access to social power and resources, and kept in a state of exploitation. 
Group identity provides a useful heuristic to the moral exclusion process by 
making it easy to identify who is part of the scope of justice. Social categorization allows 
individuals to discriminate who is part of the scope of justice based on group member-
ship (Wenzel, 2009). Individuals who are ingroup members are usually included in the 
scope of justice; those who are outgroup members might be denied justice based on 
group membership. Groups that are categorized as deviant, aborrhent, or threatening 
are likely to be excluded from the scope of justice and their members can be denied jus-
tice (Deutsch, 2006).  
Intergroup threat is an important factor in moral exclusion and had been shown 
empirically to be related to attitudes and prejudice indicative of moral exclusion (e.g., 
Canetti et al., 2009; Corneille et al., 2001; Halperin et al., 2007; Maoz & McCauley, 2008; 
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McLaren, 2003; Passini, 2008; Quillian, 1995; Watts, 1996). Two particular forms of 
threat, symbolic and realistic, have been proposed to be causes of prejudice and moral 
exclusion (Stephan et al., 2009). Symbolic threat represents threats to ingroup core val-
ues and cohesion, so it should be especially likely to be associated with the cognitive, 
emotional, and behavioral responses that might lead to moral exclusion from the scope 
of justice. 
Conceptual hypotheses 
The present research works from moral exclusion theory and intergroup threat 
theory to hypothesize predictable relationships between intergroup threat and moral 
exclusion from the scope of justice. Moral exclusion theory proposes that one anteced-
ent of moral exclusion is intergroup threat (Deutsch, 2006), and previous research has 
demonstrated that intergroup threats to an ingroup’s culture and economics are associ-
ated with prejudice and attitudes consistent with moral exclusion (e.g., Canetti, 
Halperin, Hobfoll, Shapira, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; Corneille, Yzerbyt, Rogier, & 
Buidin, 2001; Halperin, Pedahzur, & Canetti-Nisim, 2007; McLaren, 2003; Passini, 2008; 
Watts, 1996). ITT proposes that perceived outgroup threat is a cause of prejudice toward 
an outgroup, and that threats to an ingroup’s values, morals, and cultural worldview 
(symbolic or cultural threats) represent threats to the group’s core values and cohesion, 
so symbolic threats are particularly likely to elicit attitudes and behaviors consistent 
with moral exclusion (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009).  
Therefore, it can be expected that greater intergroup threat will be associated 
with greater moral exclusion. It can also be expected that threats to an ingroup’s values, 
morals, and worldview (cultural/symbolic threats) and threats to an ingroup’s re-
sources or power (economic/realistic threats) will both be associated with greater moral 
exclusion, but that the relationship will be stronger for symbolic threats. It can be ex-
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pected that symbolic and realistic threats perceived to be posed by an outgroup are a 
cause of moral exclusion from the scope of justice, and that the causal relationship could 
be mediated by prejudice toward the outgroup. 
Statement of Problem 
Social groups are formed when individuals collectively perceive themselves as a 
group, sharing a common identity with shared values, norms, and beliefs, and experi-
encing interdependence with each other (Turner, 1987). However, experiments in min-
imal group formation have shown that mere categorization of the self and others into 
group membership is sufficient to give rise to group cohesion and intergroup percep-
tion and discrimination (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Turner, Sachdev, & Hogg, 1983). This re-
sults in the formation of psychological groups that show collective behavior related to 
their group membership consistent with group identity, as well as behavior toward 
other groups based on group identity. This group identity process often gives rise to 
beneficial outcomes for the group in the form of ingroup bias that helps raise intergroup 
distinctiveness (Turner, 1987), but this same bias can give rise to discrimination against 
outgroups. 
When an individual is perceived as part of an ingroup, he or she is usually treat-
ed with the same high standards of fair treatment that ingroup members expect from 
other ingroup members; he or she is part of the ingroup members’ moral community 
(Deutsch, 1985) and within the scope of justice (Opotow, 1990b). Those who are deviant 
ingroup members, or members of outgroups perceived to have divergent social identi-
ties and perceived be a threat to the ingroup, may be extracted from our moral commu-
nity, placed outside the scope of justice, and subjected to treatment with standards of 
justice lesser than those within the scope of justice. This moral exclusion creates a pre-
cipitating condition for perpetration of direct or structural violence against those out-
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side the scope of justice, often in the service of protecting the ingroup from some per-
ceived threat. 
The influence of perceived threats on moral exclusion is the topic of the present 
investigation. The existing literature on threat’s effects has found symbolic threats 
(threats to a dominant ingroup’s values, morals, beliefs, and worldview) and realistic 
threats (threats to resources and welfare) to be predictive of prejudice and attitudes re-
lated to moral exclusion (i.e., Canetti et al., 2009; Corneille et al., 2001; Halperin et al., 
2007; McLaren, 2003; Passini, 2008; Watts, 1996). These previous studies have sometimes 
conflated symbolic and realistic threat and have only measured prejudice and attitudes 
related to moral exclusion. Therefore, what is unclear from the literature is whether 
symbolic and realistic threats are directly related to moral exclusion, what independent 
contribution symbolic and realistic threats make to moral exclusion, and whether sym-
bolic and realistic threats cause moral exclusion. 
Experimental context of the present studies 
In order to better understand the relationship between perceived symbolic and 
realistic threat and moral exclusion, two studies have been conducted. The first study 
sought to establish that perceived symbolic and realistic threat posed by an outgroup 
are correlated with moral exclusion toward that outgroup. ITT proposes that symbolic 
and realistic threats are a cause of prejudice (Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009), and 
prejudice has been shown to be positively correlated with moral exclusion (Leighton, 
Passini, Ricca, Shelden, & Schroeder, 2012). It would be expected, therefore, that greater 
symbolic and/or realistic threat would be associated with greater moral exclusion. 
The second study was conducted to establish whether experimentally induced 
symbolic and/or realistic threats from an outgroup cause increased moral exclusion. 
Prior research showed that when symbolic and realistic threats toward an immigrant 
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outgroup were induced experimentally, the combined symbolic and realistic threats led 
to more negative attitudes (i.e., dislike, rejection, unfriendliness, resentment, disrespect, 
and disapproval) toward the outgroup (Stephan, 2005; see also Branscombe & Wann, 
1994; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998). If 
intergroup symbolic and/or realistic threats are a cause of prejudice, and prejudice is 
correlated with moral exclusion, two possibilities exist for the causal relationship from 
intergroup threat to moral exclusion. The first is that intergroup threat directly causes 
moral exclusion. The second is that perceived threat causes prejudice, which mediates 
the relationship between perceived threat and moral exclusion. The present research is 
the first empirical test of these hypotheses.  
 
Study 1 
It is generally hypothesized in the present studies that intergroup threats will be 
associated with moral exclusion of an outgroup from the scope of justice. Study 1 tests 
the hypothesis that moral exclusion of an outgroup will be positively correlated with 
symbolic and realistic threats perceived to be posed by that outgroup. While both sym-
bolic and realistic threats are expected to be correlated with moral exclusion, ITT pre-
dicts that because symbolic threat represent a threat to the group’s identity, symbolic 
threat may be especially likely to elicit moral exclusion. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred fifty participants were recruited from the introductory psychology 
subject pool at the University of Arkansas, for which participants received course credit. 
The participants responded to a solicitation for an experiment entitled “Thinking About 
People.” Participants were required to be at least 18 years old.  
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Eleven participants reported being either Latino or first- or second-generation 
immigrants of the countries included in the moral exclusion measure and were exclud-
ed from the analysis. The remaining 139 participants had a mean age of 19.8 years old 
(SD = 3.6), and most were women (N = 94, 67.6%). One hundred twenty-one partici-
pants (87.1%) self-reported race as white, six (4.3%) Black, two (1.4%) Native American, 
two (1.4%) Asian, and eight (5.8%) multiple race. 
Design 
Predictor and criterion variables. The primary goal of the present study was to 
examine the relationship between moral exclusion from the scope of justice and the per-
ceived symbolic and realistic threats posed by an immigrant outgroup. Thus, Study 1 
was a correlational study, with three variables of interest: perceived symbolic threat, 
perceived realistic threat, and moral exclusion from the scope of justice. 
Predictor variables. The two predictor variables in the present study were per-
ceived symbolic and realistic threat. These were measured using scales that have previ-
ously been used to measure perceived threat's effects on prejudice and attitudes toward 
immigrant groups (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). The scales use a seven-point 
Likert-style response format, anchored with “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. 
The symbolic threat scale (see Appendix A) includes items assessing how much 
threat an immigrant outgroup represents to ingroup values, morals, and beliefs. Sample 
items include “Immigration from [outgroup] is undermining American culture,” and 
“The values and beliefs of [outgroup] immigrants regarding moral and religious issues 
are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans.” The scale has previ-
ously demonstrated moderate internal consistency with Cronbach’s α = .68 (Stephan, 
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Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). In the present study, the scale had a Cronbach’s α level of 
.71. 
The realistic threat scale (see Appendix B) includes items such as “[outgroup] 
immigration has increased the tax burden on Americans,” and “[outgroup] immigrants 
are not displacing American workers from their jobs.” When correlated with outgroup 
attitudes, this scale shows larger correlations than other measures of realistic threat 
(Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). The scale has previously demonstrated good internal 
consistency with Cronbach’s α = .82 (Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). In the present 
study, the scale had a Cronbach’s α level of .81. 
The target outgroup used for the measurement of symbolic and realistic threat in 
this study was Mexican immigrants. This group was chosen largely because Latino im-
migrants have been identified in a recent national representative survey to elicit the 
most worry about the effects they might have on American communities (Valentino, 
Brader, & Jardina, 2011). Also, Mexican immigrants have been shown in data recently 
collected by the author, using the population under study (University of Arkansas un-
dergraduates), to be subject to greater moral exclusion than other outgroups (e.g., 
French, Canadians). In addition, the most recent U.S. census data (2010) show Latinos 
are the largest immigrant group in Arkansas (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012b), and Mexicans 
comprise the largest nationality among Hispanics in the state (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2012a); thus, the group is likely salient to participants in the present research. 
Criterion variables. The main criterion variable of interest was the Inclu-
sion/Exclusion of Other Groups (IEG) scale (Passini, 2010; Appendix C) that measures 
the degree to which a set of target outgroups are considered part of the scope of justice. 
The scale consists of 4 items on a semantic differential scale that measure (a) the degree 
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to which various outgroups are seen as a threat/opportunity to ingroup well-being, (b) 
how much they deserve no respect/utmost respect, (c) interest in avoiding con-
tact/engaging in constructive contact with the outgroups, and (d) how uncivi-
lized/civilized the outgroups are. The scale ranges from -3 (most exclusionary) to +3 
(most inclusionary).  
The IEG measure asks participants to evaluate each of several outgroups on the 
four items above. The immigrant outgroups used in the scale for the present studies 
(Canadian, Mexican; French, Italian; Chinese, Korean) were chosen to represent a large 
potential moral universe. They were paired in geographical proximity, and had varying 
levels of similarity to, and dissimilarity from, the participants. When all outgroups in 
the scale are considered together, the scale can be an indicator of the breadth of an indi-
vidual's scope of justice across diverse groups in the individual’s potential moral uni-
verse. 
The IEG measure correlates with social distance (rs = -.42 to -.66), self-concept as 
a world citizen (r = .32), blatant prejudice and subtle prejudice (rs = -.64 and -.49, respec-
tively), and social dominance orientation (r = -.53). The scale has shown high internal 
consistency (Cronbach's α = .91 to .96; Passini & Morselli, 2011). The IEG scale is va-
lenced such that positive scores represent greater moral inclusion, while negative scores 
represent greater exclusion. In order to maintain consistency with the concept of moral 
exclusion, however, the scores on this scale were reversed for analysis such that positive 
scores represent moral exclusion in this study. 
The IEG measure includes one item that directly assesses perceived threat (“Val-
ues held by this group represent a [threat/opportunity] to our well-being”). It is possi-
ble that the results obtained on this question in the IEG will simply be a measure of per-
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ceived threat rather than measuring moral exclusion, creating a potential confound with 
the predictor variables. Therefore, a second measure of moral exclusion was developed 
for this study to overcome any confounding effects of the manipulation of threat and 
the moral exclusion measurement. 
The Leighton Moral Exclusion Scale (LMES; see Appendix D) includes 18 items 
measured on a 7-point Likert-style scale anchored with “disagree strongly” and “agree 
strongly.” The scale is valenced such that higher scores indicate greater moral exclusion. 
This new measure of moral exclusion was included among the criterion variables in this 
study to avoid the potential confound with threat presented by the IEG and to provide 
some concurrent validity for the IEG. 
 The LMES has 12 items measuring Opotow’s three elements of the scope of jus-
tice: allocation of resources, sacrifice for the well-being of the outgroup, and considera-
tions of fairness. Allocation of resources is measured by five statements that public re-
sources should be used for the benefit of the outgroup. Sacrifice for well-being is meas-
ured by three statements that the welfare of the outgroup should be improved even if it 
means sacrificing the ingroup’s needs. Consideration of fairness is measured by four 
statements that the outgroup should be taken advantage of by the ingroup and give into 
the ingroup’s demands. This measurement of consideration of fairness was based on a 
definition of fairness provided by Rawls (1958): fair relations are predicated on the per-
ception that neither party is taken advantage of nor forced to give into the demands of 
the other. 
The LMES also includes six items measuring two important dimensions of moral 
inclusion: social centrality and social capital. Social centrality (Lefebvre, 1976; Nagle, 
2009) is a psycho-spatial ordering of hierarchical power structures in a society whereby 
marginalized groups are excluded from the centers of power. Social capital (Putnam, 
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2000; Uslaner, 2002) is the degree to which groups are connected in a cross-cutting of 
social and power hierarchies, and implies a level of reciprocal trust. Social capital ena-
bles the movement of resources and power across these hierarchies. The concepts of so-
cial capital and social centrality emerge from sociological theory and have not previous-
ly been addressed in moral exclusion research. 
For the present study, the target outgroup for the LMES was limited to Mexican 
immigrants because the length of the measure would have been excessive with the in-
clusion of multiple outgroups. Further development of the LMES might create a version 
appropriate for a broader measurement of the scope of justice across the moral uni-
verse, along the lines of the IEG measure. 
Control variable. It is plausible that moral exclusion may be driven solely by 
general prejudice against the outgroup. The present study included a measure of preju-
dice so that its effect in the relationship between perceived threats and moral exclusion 
could be statistically controlled. Participants were measured for their level of general 
prejudice toward each of the target immigrant groups (French, Mexican, Canadian, Ko-
rean, Italian, and Chinese). This was done using a “feeling thermometer” type instru-
ment (e.g. Campbell, 1971; Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993; McConahay, 1986; Miller, 
Smith, & Mackie, 2004; Olson, 2009; Pearson, 2010; Valentino et al., 2011) that presented 
a horizontal bar shaded in gradations from white to black, below which were tempera-
tures in 10° increments from 0° to 100°, and anchored “Very Cold Feeling” and “Very 
Warm Feeling.” Participants indicated below the thermometer their feeling in degrees 
toward each immigrant group. 
The feeling thermometer is valenced such that higher scores represent more posi-
tive feelings. In order to make interpretation more consistent with the concept of preju-
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dice, the scores were reversed for analysis such that higher scores represent greater 
prejudice in this study. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in group testing situations with group size ranging from 
10 to 16 participants. After being greeted by the experimenter, they were seated at op-
posite ends of long tables to preserve confidentiality of their responses. They then com-
pleted questionnaire packets containing a demographic questionnaire (Appendix E) fol-
lowed by the scales measuring perceived symbolic threat (Appendix A) and realistic 
threat (Appendix B), the IEG scale (Appendix C), the prejudice scale, and the LMES 
(Appendix D).3 All participants completed the packets, after which they were debriefed, 
thanked for their participation, and released from the experiment. 
Results 
Internal Consistency 
All measures used showed moderate to high internal consistency as demonstrat-
ed by Cronbach’s α levels. The symbolic and realistic threat scales had α levels of .71 
and .81, respectively. The IEG scale had an α = .96, and the LMES showed an overall α = 
.92. The means, standard deviations, and number of subjects for each measure are in-
cluded in Table 1.  
Bivariate correlations 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated to examine the relationships 
between the variables of interest. The LMES included only Mexican immigrants as the 
target group, whereas the IEG included Mexican immigrants along with other groups. 
To aid comparison between the LMES and IEG scores, the IEG score for just the Mexi-
can immigrant group was included in the results in addition to the overall IEG score 
(which includes all immigrant groups combined).  
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Table 1 
 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Participants for All Variables in Study 1. 
 
  
Variable Mean SD N
Symbolic threat 4.01 0.93 139
Realistic threat 3.73 1.01 139
Prejudice (all groups) 31.90 18.07 138
Prejudice (Mexican only) 38.84 22.63 138
IEG (all groups) -1.53 0.98 136
IEG, Mexican only -1.13 1.27 136
LMES 3.15 1.06 139
Means, SD, N for study 1
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It was hypothesized in the present study that moral exclusion of an outgroup, as 
measured by the IEG and LMES scales, will be positively correlated with symbolic and 
realistic threats perceived to be posed by that outgroup, as measured by the symbolic 
and realistic threat scales. All correlations were significant and in the expected direction 
(Table 2). The IEG scores correlated with both symbolic threat and realistic threat (both 
rs = .53, ps < .001). The IEG scores for Mexican immigrants only also correlated with 
symbolic (r = .62, p < .001) and realistic threat (r = .63, p < .001). The LMES scores had 
the highest correlation with symbolic (r = .72, p < .001) and realistic threat (r = .77, p < 
.001). 
Because prejudice was correlated with the moral exclusion scales (rs = .48 to .61, 
ps < .001), it could account for at least part of the correlation between moral exclusion 
and symbolic and realistic threat. To test this, partial correlation coefficients were calcu-
lated to statistically control for the influence of prejudice. The correlation coefficients 
were reduced but remained significant (Table 3). In computing the partial correlation 
coefficient for the IEG scale, the mean prejudice score for all six immigrant outgroups 
was used. After controlling for the effect of prejudice, IEG scores were significantly cor-
related with symbolic (r = .36, p < .001) and realistic threat (r = .38, p < .001). Prejudice 
scores for only the Mexican immigrant outgroup were used in calculating the partial 
correlation coefficients for the IEG (Mexican only) score and the LMES score. After con-
trolling for prejudice, IEG (Mexican only) scores were significantly correlated with 
symbolic (r = .46, p < .001) and realistic threat (r = .47, p < .001), and the LMES scores 
were also correlated with symbolic (r = .63, p < .001) and realistic threat (r = .68, p < 
.001). 
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Table 2 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients (and Degrees of Freedom) Among Study Variables for Study 1 
 
 
Note: All coefficients are significant at p < .001  
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Table 3 
 
Partial Correlation Coefficients (and Degrees of Freedom) for Symbolic and Realistic Threat and 
Moral Exclusion Measures, Controlling for Prejudice for Study 1 
 
 
Notes: All coefficients are significant at p < .001. Mean prejudice for all outgroups used 
for IEG. Prejudice for Mexican outgroup used for IEG (Mexican only) and LMES. 
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Regression analysis 
Although both symbolic and realistic threats are expected to be correlated with 
moral exclusion, ITT predicts that because symbolic threat represent a threat to the 
group’s identity, symbolic threat may be especially likely to elicit moral exclusion. To 
better understand the unique predictive relationships between symbolic and realistic 
threat and moral exclusion, a multiple regression was used. The analysis strategy used a 
moderated multiple regression technique (e.g., Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen & Cohen, 
1983) to assess the relative predictive power of perceived symbolic threat and perceived 
realistic threats on the moral exclusion measures after accounting for general prejudice. 
Separate hierarchical regression analyses were conducted for each criterion variable. 
Each of the predictors was centered by subtracting the mean of the predictor from each 
score (e.g., Aiken & West, 1991). In Step 1, the prejudice measure was entered into the 
equation as the covariate; in Step 2 the two predictors, symbolic and realistic threat, 
were simultaneously entered; in Step 3 the interaction term was entered as the product 
term of symbolic and realistic threat.4 This procedure was done for each of the criterion 
variables: IEG, IEG (Mexican only), and the LMES. For the IEG criterion variable, the 
mean prejudice scores for all outgroups was used as the covariate. For the IEG (Mexican 
only) and LMES, the prejudice score for the Mexican immigrant outgroup only was 
used as the covariate. Preliminary analyses showed the data to be free from violation of 
assumption of normality, and all components had tolerance scores greater than .10 and 
variance inflation factor (VIF) scores smaller than 10, indicating multicollinearity was 
not a problem. 
 
IEG. For the IEG using all groups, prejudice was calculated by using the mean 
feeling thermometer values for all outgroups. In Step 1, prejudice strongly predicted 
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IEG scores (β = .59) and explained 35% of variance in IEG scores, F(1,133) = 71.36, p < 
.001. In Step 2, prejudice remained the strongest predictor of IEG scores (β = .41), but 
perceived symbolic and realistic threat uniquely predicted IEG scores (βs = .19 and .23 
respectively), F(3,131) = 37.64, p < .001, and explained an additional 12% of variance, 
Fchange(2,131) = 13.60, p < .001. Step 3 showed no significant increase in explained vari-
ance, indicating the interaction term did not contribute to predicting IEG scores (see Ta-
ble 4). 
IEG (Mexican Only). For the IEG (Mexican only), the feeling thermometer score 
for the Mexican immigrant outgroup was used as the measure of prejudice. In Step 1, 
prejudice strongly predicted IEG scores (β = .61) and explained 37% of variance in IEG 
scores, F(1,133) = 77.92, p < .001. In Step 2, prejudice remained the strongest predictor of 
IEG scores (β = .34), but perceived symbolic and realistic threat uniquely predicted IEG 
scores (βs = .26 and .28 respectively), F(3,131) = 51.60, p < .001, and explained an addi-
tional 17% of variance, Fchange(2,131) = 24.61, p < .001. Step 3 showed no significant in-
crease in explained variance, indicating the interaction terms did not contribute to pre-
dicting IEG (Mexican only) scores (see Table 5). 
LMES. For the LMES, the feeling thermometer score toward Mexican immigrants 
only was used as the measure of prejudice. In Step 1, prejudice strongly predicted 
LMES scores (β = .54) and explained 28% of variance in LMES scores, F(1,136) = 52.61, p 
< .001. In Step 2, prejudice was the weakest predictor of LMES scores (β = .12), and per-
ceived symbolic and realistic threat uniquely predicted LMES scores (β = .35 and .47 re-
spectively), F(3,134) = 91.89, p < .001, and explained an additional 39% of variance, 
Fchange(2,134) = 80.70, p < .001. Step 3 showed no significant increase in explained 
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Table 4 
 
Regression Analysis Summary for Symbolic and Realistic Threat as Predictors of IEG, Control-
ling for General Prejudice for Study 1 
 
 
Note: R2 = .35 for Step 1, p < .001; ΔR2 = .12 for Step 2, p < .001; ΔR2 = .00 for Step 3, p = 
.796. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001  
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Table 5 
 
Regression Analysis Summary for Symbolic and Realistic Threat as Predictors of IEG Scores for 
the Mexican Outgroup Only, Controlling for General Prejudice for Study 1 
 
 
Note: R2 = .37 for Step 1, p < .001; ΔR2 = .17 for Step 2, p < .001; ΔR2 = .01 for Step 3, p = 
.172 
** p < .01, *** p < .001  
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variance, indicating the interaction terms did not contribute to predicting LMES scores 
(see Table 6).  
To test for significant differences between the predictive power of symbolic 
threat and realistic threat in Step 2 of each regression, a procedure for post-hoc  
comparisons of correlations from the same sample was used (Steiger, 1980; Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2007). For IEG, IEG (Mexican only), and LMES as criterion variables, there 
were no significant differences between symbolic threat and realistic threat as predic-
tors in Step 2, Steiger’s Z = .402, .048, and -.748 respectively. 
 
Discussion 
The results of the present study support Hypothesis 1, that greater perceived cul-
tural and/or economic threats from an outgroup should be associated with greater 
moral exclusion. Perceived symbolic and realistic threat represented by a Mexican im-
migrant outgroup were measured along with moral exclusion using two different in-
struments, and it was found that moral exclusion of Mexican immigrants was positively 
correlated with both symbolic and realistic threat. It was also found that both symbolic 
and realistic threats uniquely predicted moral exclusion scores after taking into account 
the effect of prejudice on moral exclusion. This finding is consistent with previous re-
search findings that both of these threats uniquely predict variance in attitudes toward 
outgroups (Riek et al., 2006). 
When moral exclusion was measured for multiple immigrant outgroups as was 
done in the overall IEG measure, perceived symbolic and realistic threat posed by Mex-
ican immigrants was associated with increased moral exclusion for all groups, not just 
the Mexican outgroup. Thus, these threats may generalize to other immigrant out-
groups or perhaps even to non-immigrant outgroups. This result indicates that 
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Table 6 
 
Regression Analysis Summary for Symbolic and Realistic Threat as Predictors of the LMES, 
Controlling for General Prejudice for Study 1 
 
 
Note: R2 = .28 for Step 1, p < .001; ΔR2 = .39 for Step 2, p < .001; ΔR2 = .01 for Step 3, p = 
.116 
* p < .05, *** p < .001  
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perceived symbolic and realistic threats posed by one outgroup may have the effect of 
shrinking the scope of justice as it encompasses other outgroups in one’s moral uni-
verse. In this case, all of the outgroups were immigrant outgroups, so it may be that this 
scope of justice contraction applies to outgroups with a similar social categorization 
(immigrants). Additional research to test the effects of these threats on moral exclusion 
of dissimilarly categorized outgroups (e.g. immigrants vs. homosexuals) could illumi-
nate the scope of this threat generalization. 
After controlling for prejudice, there were no significant differences in the rela-
tive power of either symbolic or realistic threats to predict moral exclusion in the pre-
sent study. This is contrary to ITT, which proposes that symbolic threats should better 
predict moral exclusion (Stephan et al., 2009). To my knowledge, this is the first empiri-
cal test of this hypothesis. Further studies can establish whether this finding is replica-
ble. Although prejudice has a strong effect on moral exclusion, the present study 
demonstrated that perceived symbolic and realistic threats predict moral exclusion 
uniquely from general prejudice. An interesting and unexpected finding was that the 
IEG measure of moral exclusion from the scope of justice is prone to being more strong-
ly affected by prejudice than by perceived symbolic and realistic threats, whereas the 
LMES is more strongly predicted by these perceived threats than by prejudice. In other 
words, compared with the IEG measure, the LMES appears to be more sensitive to ex-
clusion in the context of symbolic and realistic threat than it is to exclusion based on 
generalized prejudice. 
It is possible that the difference in sensitivity to prejudice of the IEG and LMES 
may be due to intergroup emotions. Under Intergroup Emotion Theory (Mackie et al., 
2000; Miller et al., 2004), when in situations where group membership is salient, indi-
viduals experience emotions based in part on their group memberships. If the individu-
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al appraises the outgroup as negatively impacting the ingroup (e.g. threatening), then 
negative emotions (e.g., fear, anger) could be experienced as a product of group mem-
bership. The outgroup will then be the target of these emotions, which will in turn affect 
prejudice. In fact, intergroup emotion, particularly negative emotion, has been shown to 
be the largest predictor of prejudice, over and above stereotypes, intergroup contact, 
and social dominance orientation (Miller et al., 2004). 
If an individual is experiencing negative intergroup emotion, and thus greater 
prejudice toward the outgroup, and if the IEG measure is more prone than the LMES to 
measure responses based on intergroup emotions, then the IEG may be more strongly 
influenced by prejudice as a function of intergroup emotion. The IEG measure includes 
items that would seem on their face to be more sensitive to affect (i.e., 
threat/opportunity, disrespect/respect, avoid/engage in contact, and uncivi-
lized/civilized). In contrast, the LMES uses items focused on decisions for allocating 
tangible and intangible social goods (e.g., political power, economic resources, fairness, 
trust). Thus, compared with the LMES, moral exclusion measured using the IEG may be 
more affected by prejudice as a product of negative intergroup emotion. 
 
Study 2 
The results of Study 1 supported the hypothesis that perceived symbolic and re-
alistic threats are positively correlated with moral exclusion and a contraction of the 
scope of justice. It was also found that both symbolic and realistic threat uniquely pre-
dicted moral exclusion, over and above prejudice. It is also of interest to know whether 
this relationship is causal. That is, when an ingroup member is induced to perceive an 
outgroup as posing a symbolic and/or realistic threat to the ingroup, is this perceived 
threat a cause of greater moral exclusion? Consistent with ITT, it is generally hypothe-
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sized in the present study that both symbolic and realistic threats should be causally re-
lated to moral exclusion, and that this relationship may be mediated by prejudice to-
ward the outgroup. Although ITT proposes that symbolic threats should be especially 
likely to be related to moral exclusion, the result of Study 1 did not support this predic-
tion. Therefore, no specific hypothesis can be made for the relative weight of symbolic 
threat over realistic threat in inducing moral exclusion in the present study. 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-seven participants were recruited from the introductory psychology sub-
ject pool at the University of Arkansas. The participants responded to a solicitation for 
an experiment entitled “Thinking About People,” for which participants received 
course credit. Participants were required to be at least 18 years old.  
Five participants were excluded from analysis because they self-identified as of 
Latino ethnicity, two of whom were first or second-generation immigrants from the 
countries included in the IEG measure. The remaining 82 participants were mostly 
women (N = 62, 75.6%) and had a mean age of 19.2 years old (SD = 3.4). Most self-
identified race as White (N = 72, 87.8%), two (2.4%) as Asian, one (1.2%) as Black, and 
seven (8.5%) as multiple race. 
Design 
Study 2 was concerned with the causal effects of symbolic and realistic threats on 
moral exclusion. Thus, there were two independent variables of interest: symbolic 
threat and realistic threat (Stephan et al., 1999; Stephan et al., 2009). The design was a 2 
(symbolic threat present vs. absent) × 2 (realistic threat present vs. absent) between-
subjects factorial experiment. 
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Procedure 
Participants in groups of size 12–16 completed an informed consent form fol-
lowed by a questionnaire packet. The first page of the packet was a demographic ques-
tionnaire (Appendix E). This was followed by a page containing the stimulus materi-
als—newspaper articles purportedly from the web page of a major national newspaper, 
but actually written for this study by the author.5 The articles described a recently re-
leased report by the “National Commission on Immigration,” made up of experts on 
immigration. Participants were instructed to read the article, thinking about how much 
it would affect “you, and Americans like you,” over the next 3–7 years. 
There were four versions of the article, representing each of the conditions in the 
experiment. The realistic threat present, symbolic threat absent condition described the 
drain on the economy created by immigration from Mexico and its effect on university 
education through reduced scholarships and increased class sizes and tuition cost (Ap-
pendix F). The symbolic threat present, realistic threat absent condition described the threat 
to American culture from Spanish language replacing the use of English and immi-
grants forcing changes to higher education by disrupting traditions and values (Ap-
pendix G). The realistic threat present, symbolic threat present condition included both of 
the above arguments (Appendix H), and the realistic threat absent, symbolic threat absent 
condition described the report as detailing the financial and personal costs incurred by 
immigrants from Mexico, thus retaining the theme of Mexican immigration but not in-
cluding symbolic or realistic threat (Appendix I). 
Following the article was a questionnaire assessing the article’s style and gram-
mar, followed by questions asking participants how important they thought the news in 
the article was to Americans like them and how much it would affect Americans like 
them over the next 3–7 years. The intent of these questions was to partially mask the 
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manipulation intent of the articles and to focus participants on the issues in the articles 
and their relevance to the participant’s ingroup. Next the packet contained the IEG 
measurement of moral inclusion/exclusion (Appendix C), a “feeling thermometer” 
measurement of general affective prejudice toward each group, and the LMES (Appen-
dix D). The packet concluded with measures of perceived symbolic (Appendix A) and 
realistic (Appendix B) threat (Stephan et al., 1999) using Mexican immigrants as the 
outgroup; these measures were included as a manipulation check.6 All measures 
showed moderate to high internal consistency as demonstrated by Cronbach’s α levels. 
The IEG scale had an α = .93. The LMES showed an overall α = .90. The perceived sym-
bolic and realistic threat scales had α levels of .75 and .85, respectively. Pearson correla-
tion coefficients for variables in Study 2 are shown in Table 7. After all participants 
completed their packets, participants were thanked for their participation, debriefed 
and dismissed. 
Results 
  
Preliminary analyses 
A preliminary analysis of the data revealed one participant whose responses constitut-
ed an influential data point. This participant’s responses on all measures of prejudice, 
moral exclusion, and perceived symbolic threat were at or above the third standard de-
viation from the mean. This participant’s responses were removed from further analy-
sis. No other participants met this criterion of extreme scores. 
As in Study 1, to aid interpretation of results, the feeling thermometer scores 
were reversed from the measured scale, such that higher scores indicate greater preju-
dice against the target group. Similarly, the IEG scale scores were reversed so that   
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Table 7 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients (and Degrees of Freedom) Among Study Variables for Study 2 
 
 * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
  
Measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Prejudice, all 
groups
—
2. Prejudice, 
Mexican only
.68***
(79)
—
3. Perceived 
symbolic threat
.45***
(79)
.52***
(79)
—
4. Perceived 
realistic threat
.34**
(79)
.41***
(79)
.54***
(79)
—
5. IEG .61***
(76)
.64***
(76)
.53***
(76)
.48***
(76)
—
6. IEG, Mexican 
only
.50***
(75)
.77***
(75)
.64***
(75)
.54***
(75)
.77***
(75)
—
7. LMES .50***
(79)
.62***
(79)
.74***
(79)
.68***
(79)
.66***
(76)
.72***
(75)
—
LMES subscales:
8. Social 
centrality
-.44***
(79)
-.56***
(79)
-.64***
(79)
-.58***
(79)
-.54***
(76)
-.67***
(75)
-.84***
(79)
—
9. Social capital -.47***
(79)
-.50***
(79)
-.54***
(79)
-.34**
(79)
-.51***
(76)
-.62***
(75)
-.69***
(79)
.54***
(79)
—
10. Allocation of 
resources
-.38***
(79)
-.57***
(79)
-.66***
(79)
-.63***
(79)
-.55***
(76)
-.66***
(75)
-.89***
(79)
.73***
(79)
.58***
(79)
—
11. Self-sacrifice -.39***
(79)
-.53***
(79)
-.54***
(79)
-.62***
(79)
-.58***
(76)
-.51***
(75)
-.81***
(79)
.61***
(79)
.67***
(79)
.67***
(79)
—
12. Consideration 
of fairness
-.31**
(79)
-.24*
(79)
-.49***
(79)
-.44***
(79)
-.41***
(76)
-.40***
(75)
-.64***
(79)
.43***
(79)
.38***
(79)
.38***
(79)
.47***
(79)
Corr Matrix, Study 2 DVs
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higher scores indicate greater moral exclusion, in line with the LMES and the concept of 
moral exclusion in this study. 
Manipulation check 
It was expected that induced perceptions of symbolic and realistic threats would 
be causally related to moral exclusion. In order to check that the symbolic and realistic 
threat manipulations induced perceptions of threat, a 3-way factorial ANOVA using 
symbolic threat, realistic threat, and sex as factors indicated there were no significant 
interactions with sex, so a 2-way ANOVA was done collapsing across sex. The 2-way 
ANOVA table is shown in Table 8. 
As expected, the symbolic threat manipulation had a significant main effect on 
perceived symbolic threat, F(1, 77) = 5.35, p = .02, partial η2 = .07, but not on perceived 
realistic threat, F(1,77) = 0.80, p = .38. Participants in the symbolic threat present condi-
tion showed greater perceived symbolic threat (M = 4.45, SD = .84) than the symbolic 
threat absent condition (M = 4.01, SD = .85). Unexpectedly, the realistic threat manipu-
lation did not have a significant main effect on perceived realistic threat. As expected, 
the realistic threat manipulation did not have an effect on perceived symbolic threat (Fs 
= 0.33, ps > .56). There were no significant interaction effects of the symbolic and realis-
tic threat manipulation on either perceived symbolic threat or realistic threat (Fs < 1.06, 
ps > .30). Means and standard deviations for all conditions are shown in Table 9.  
Analysis of Variance 
Analysis of variance was used to examine any effects of symbolic threat, realistic 
threat, sex, and their interactions on the three dependent variables of interest: IEG, IEG 
for Mexicans only, and the LMES. Although participant sex was not expected to influ-
ence the results, analysis of its effects were done to explore any effects it might have. 
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Table 8 
 
Analysis of Variance for Manipulation Checks in Study 2 
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Table 9 
 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for Manipulation Checks in Study 2 
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The 3-way ANOVA for all variables showed no significant main or interaction ef-
fects for sex, so analyses collapsing across sex were done. A 2-way ANOVA was com-
puted for each of the three dependent variables, using manipulations of symbolic and 
realistic threat as factors. 
Inclusion/Exclusion of Other Groups. It was expected that inducing perception 
of symbolic and realistic threat should cause greater moral exclusion scores on the IEG 
and LMES scales. As expected, moral exclusion as measured by the IEG, which includes 
all six immigrant outgroups, was significantly greater in the symbolic threat present 
condition (M = −1.11, SD = 0.68) than the symbolic threat absent condition (M = −1.46, 
SD = 0.74), F(1,74) = 4.52, p = .04, partial η2 = .06. Unexpectedly, the main effect for real-
istic threat was nonsignificant. There was no a priori expectation for any interaction ef-
fect, and the interaction effect was non-significant (Fs < 1.60, ps > .21). Unexpectedly, 
the IEG scores for Mexican immigrants only showed that neither main effect was signif-
icant. The interaction effect was also nonsignificant (Fs < 1.87, ps > .17). The ANOVA 
table for both IEG and IEG (Mexican only) is shown in Table 10. Means and standard 
deviations for the IEG scores are shown in Table 11. 
Leighton Moral Exclusion Scale. Contrary to expectations, moral exclusion as 
measured by the LMES showed no significant main effects for symbolic or realistic 
threat. There was no significant interaction effect (Fs < 1.25, ps > .267). The ANOVA ta-
ble for the LMES is shown in Table 12, and the means and standard deviations are 
shown in Table 13. A post-hoc ANOVA of the five LMES subscales (social centrality, 
social capital, allocation of resources, self-sacrifice, and consideration of fairness) 
showed no significant main effects, nor interaction effects, for any of the subscales. 
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Table 10 
 
Analysis of Variance for IEG scale in Study 2 
 
  
  57 
Table 11 
 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for IEG Scale in Study 2 
 
   Realistic threat
Symbolic threat Absent Present Total
IEG (all outgroups)
Absent –1.54(0.79)
–1.38
(0.71)
–1.46
(0.74)
Present –0.99(0.69)
–1.24
(0.66)
–1.11
(0.68)
Total –1.26(0.78)
–1.31
(0.68)
IEG (Mexican only)
Absent –1.05(1.29)
–0.74
(1.17)
–0.89
(1.23)
Present –0.48(0.90)
–0.57
(1.36)
–0.52
(1.12)
Total –0.76(1.14)
–0.66
(1.25)
Means (SD) for IEG ANOVA
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Table 12 
 
Analysis of Variance for the LMES in Study 2 
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Table 13 
 
Means (and Standard Deviations) for LMES Measure in Study 2 
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Mediation analysis 
It was found in the ANOVA that symbolic threat has a causal relationship to IEG 
scores. ITT proposes that prejudice is caused by intergroup threat, so it is possible that 
the significant effect of symbolic threat on moral exclusion was mediated by prejudice. 
To test for this possibility, a mediation analysis was done (e.g., Baron & Kenny, 1986).7 
For this analysis, the mean of prejudice scores for all outgroups was used as the preju-
dice measure. 
The results of the mediation analysis are shown in Figure 2. The direct effect of 
symbolic threat on IEG was significant (β = .242, p = .03). Symbolic threat was not a sig-
nificant predictor of prejudice (β = .014, p = .901), so the requirements for mediation set 
by Baron and Kenny (1986) were not met. Thus, there was no evidence that prejudice 
mediated the effect of symbolic threat on moral exclusion. 
 
Discussion 
In Study 2, it was found that participants who were induced to perceive greater 
symbolic threat showed greater moral exclusion as measured by the IEG. This finding 
supports the present study’s hypothesis that symbolic threat is a cause of moral exclu-
sion, and is in line with ITT and with prior research showing more negative intergroup 
attitudes when individuals perceive the outgroup to represent a symbolic threat. This is 
the first empirical demonstration that symbolic threat causes greater moral exclusion. 
Results of the ANOVA showed that participants in the symbolic threat condition scored 
higher on moral exclusion as measured by the overall IEG scale than those in the sym-
bolic threat absent condition. As expected, symbolic threat is a causal agent in increased 
moral exclusion. The fact that the global IEG score (across multiple outgroups) is affect-
ed by the symbolic threat manipulation indicates symbolic threat’s causal power in a   
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Figure 2. Standardized Regression Coefficients for Mediation Analysis. 
* p < .05, *** p < .001 
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contraction of the scope of justice. Unexpectedly, there were no significant differences 
for any of the moral exclusion measures in the realistic threat condition, but this result 
is consistent with the failure of the realistic threat manipulation as evidenced by the 
manipulation check. 
It was also found that although symbolic threat affected participant scores on the 
IEG using all outgroups, this effect did not occur for either the IEG using Mexican im-
migrants only or the LMES. It is unclear why the symbolic threat manipulation (which 
used Mexican immigrants as the outgroup) affected IEG scores for the overall measure 
but not IEG scores for Mexican immigrants only. One possible explanation is that be-
cause participants had read newspaper articles about Mexican immigrants, they might 
have been sensitized to an attempt to alter their attitudes toward Mexican immigrants. 
They may have then responded by resisting this attempt. This explanation draws on 
theories of reactance (Brehm, 1966) and self-presentation (Schlenker, 1980; Tetlock & 
Manstead, 1985). 
According to reactance theory, individuals are motivated to maintain freedom to 
behave and think as they wish, and when this freedom is threatened, they attempt to 
reassert their freedom (Brehm, 1966). By reasserting their freedom, they project a posi-
tive impression of themselves to real or imagined others (Schlenker, 1980). One such 
way that individuals might engage in positive impression management through reas-
serting their freedom is by resisting attitude change in the face of a persuasive message. 
When participants in the study were presented with the newspaper articles that de-
scribed threats from Mexican immigrants, they may have experienced the articles as a 
persuasive message that posed a threat to their autonomy, and reacted to the attempted 
persuasion by taking an attitude opposite of the article. Thus, they may have displayed 
an “inclusion bias” on the IEG scale in the symbolic threat condition for Mexican immi-
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grants but when reporting moral exclusion toward the other outgroups, for which there 
was no threat to their autonomy through the threat article, they had no such inclusion 
bias. Although the explanation of reactance and impression management is plausible, 
strong reactance usually requires that the threatened freedom be of high importance to 
the individual, which seems unlikely in the case of a newspaper article being a threat to 
the decisional autonomy of undergraduate participants.  
A perhaps more parsimonious and more likely explanation is that the partici-
pants experienced measurement reactivity (Campbell, 1957; Campbell & Stanley, 1963), 
whereby the presence of the Mexican immigration threat article made participants self-
conscious and aware of the experimental context. This self-awareness may have led par-
ticipants to want to seem more inclusionary toward Mexican immigrants in an attempt 
to engage in impression management toward the experimenter or some imagined other. 
Since participants were reading about Mexican immigrants, they may not have experi-
enced reactivity to the measurement of exclusion of non-Mexican immigrants. The de-
briefing protocol did not probe for any suspicion or other evidence of reactivity effects, 
so this explanation cannot be tested. 
Since ITT predicts that symbolic threat causes prejudice, it is possible that the 
causal effect of symbolic threat on moral exclusion was mediated by prejudice toward 
the outgroups. However, the results of the mediation analysis gave no evidence that 
prejudice mediates the relationship between symbolic threat and moral exclusion. The 
lack of a significant relationship between the symbolic threat condition and prejudice 
indicates that participants in the symbolic threat present condition showed no greater 
prejudice than the symbolic threat absent condition. This contradicts ITT’s prediction 
that symbolic threat causes prejudice. However, this may be due to the use of an out-
group (Mexican immigrants) for which participants had prior attitudes. The partici-
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pants may have already formed prejudicial attitudes toward Mexican immigrants that 
may be resistant to being altered by the manipulation. 
Unexpectedly, the ANOVA showed that realistic threats did not affect moral ex-
clusion. This is likely due to a failure of the realistic threat induction. The experiment 
used newspaper articles that described threats posed by Mexican immigrants in order 
to experimentally induce symbolic and/or realistic threat. The manipulation check indi-
cated that although the newspaper articles induced greater perceived symbolic threat, 
the newspaper articles failed to elicit the expected increase in perceived realistic threat.  
The failure of the realistic threat manipulation and the success of the symbolic 
threat manipulation might be because participants thought the realistic threat was un-
important and it did not affect them, but thought the symbolic threat was important 
and did affect them. The study asked participants how important the news was to them 
or Americans like them, and how much they thought the issues in the articles would 
affect them and Americans like them over the next 3, 5, and 7 years. Post-hoc analyses 
of these questions revealed no significant main effects for the symbolic or realistic threat 
conditions for how important they thought the news was, or how much it would affect 
them in the next 5 or 7 years. For the question asking how much it would affect them 
over the next 3 years, there was no significant main effect for the symbolic threat condi-
tion, but there was a significant main effect for the realistic threat condition. Participants 
thought the news would affect them more in the realistic threat present condition (M = 
5.78, SD = 1.31) than the realistic threat absent condition (M = 5.28, SD = 1.13). If the 
success of the threat manipulations was due to how much participants thought the 
news was important to them or would affect them, then it would be expected that the 
symbolic threat manipulation would have failed because there were no significant dif-
ferences in these variables when the symbolic threat was absent or present. In addition, 
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the main effect of the realistic threat condition on how much they would be affected in 
the next 3 years would suggest that the realistic threat manipulation should have been 
successful, but it was not. Overall, these results do not support the explanation that par-
ticipants thought the symbolic threat was important or would affect them, but realistic 
threat was unimportant and did not affect them. 
Another explanation for the failure of the realistic threat manipulation is that 
participants may be keenly attuned to the potential realistic threat posed by Mexican 
immigrants as a result of current media coverage and political rhetoric surrounding 
Mexican immigration. If the participants came to the experiment with prior exposure to 
realistic threats through media, the increase in threat perception attainable in the exper-
imental manipulation might have been very low. In contrast, participants may come to 
the experiment with less awareness of potential symbolic threats posed by Mexican 
immigrants, which are less prominent in media and political rhetoric. Consequently, 
exposure to the idea of symbolic threats posed by Mexican immigrants within the ex-
periment may have a greater effect on perceived symbolic threat than exposure to the 
realistic threat manipulation would on perceived realistic threat; this difference may 
lead to detectable changes in perceived symbolic threat but not perceived realistic 
threat. 
Content analyses of media stories on Mexican immigration provides support for 
the relatively greater media coverage of realistic threats over symbolic threats. In an 
analysis of immigration coverage in four major U.S. newspapers from June, 2008 to 
June, 2009, the topics of crime and economics were the two most common topics in 
newspaper stories, and these topics appeared in over 80% of the stories studied 
(Chavez, Whiteford, & Hoewe, 2010).8 A content analysis of immigration-related letters 
to the editor appearing in a major Arizona newspaper during the 2005 calendar year 
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showed that economic threat was referred to twice as often as cultural threat (Costelloe, 
2008). Another analysis of U.S. statements by politicians appearing in English language 
newspapers worldwide between 1993 and 1999 on the topic of Mexican immigration 
found that economic issues were twice as likely to be the topic of the article than cultur-
al issues, and these references were overwhelmingly negative toward the effects of 
Mexican immigration (Magaña & Short, 2002). 
Another possible reason for the failure of the realistic threat manipulation is sug-
gested in a meta-analytic review of research on intergroup threat and outgroup atti-
tudes. The relationship between perceived realistic threat and outgroup attitudes is 
generally weaker for studies that manipulate realistic threat than those that measure ex-
isting perceptions of realistic threat. In contrast, there is no such difference for studies 
manipulating versus measuring symbolic threat (Riek et al., 2006). In other words, un-
like symbolic threat, it is generally more difficult to induce realistic threat perception 
leading to attitude change than it is to measure existing attitudes and realistic threat 
perception. 
General Discussion 
The present research demonstrated that perceived symbolic and realistic threats 
posed by an outgroup predict moral exclusion independently of prejudice toward the 
outgroup (Study 1), and that symbolic threat posed by an outgroup is a causal agent in 
moral exclusion (Study 2), an effect not mediated by prejudice. Theoretical approaches 
to moral exclusion and the scope of justice have proposed that intergroup threat may be 
an important factor in moral exclusion (e.g., Deutsch, 2006). Intergroup threats have 
been shown in previous studies to predict exclusionary intergroup attitudes and preju-
dice (e.g., McLaren, 2003; Quillian, 1995), and many of these studies have shown cultur-
al and economic threats (which are analogous to symbolic and realistic threat) to predict 
  67 
attitudes consistent with moral exclusion (e.g., Canetti et al., 2009; Corneille et al., 2001; 
Halperin et al., 2007; Passini, 2008; Watts, 1996). But many of the studies have conflated 
cultural and economic threat. The present studies provide direct evidence that symbolic 
and realistic threat make unique contributions in predicting moral exclusion, even 
when accounting for prejudice. Further, symbolic threat was shown to have a causal 
role in moral exclusion. 
Intergroup Threat Theory 
The present research used ITT as a rubric for understanding the relationship be-
tween symbolic and realistic threats and moral exclusion. ITT proposes that both per-
ceived symbolic and realistic threats should be related to moral exclusion, but that sym-
bolic threats should be especially likely to lead to moral exclusion (Stephan et al., 2009). 
The results of Study 1 are contrary to ITT. Although both perceived symbolic and realis-
tic threat are unique predictors of moral exclusion, perceived realistic threat is a slight-
ly, and non-significantly, stronger predictor of moral exclusion than symbolic threat. 
Other data support this finding that perceived symbolic and realistic threat have similar 
strength in predicting moral exclusion. For example, a study using a 1997 Eurobarome-
ter survey of 17 European Union countries found that both symbolic and realistic threat 
were relatively strong predictors of desire for expulsion of immigrants, and had nearly 
identical predictive power (McLaren, 2003). These results along with the present re-
search bring into question the postulate of ITT that perceived symbolic threat is espe-
cially likely to lead to moral exclusion. 
Even though perceived symbolic threat was not shown to predict moral exclu-
sion more strongly than realistic threat, two results from the present studies provide ev-
idence of its importance in moral exclusion. First, symbolic threat was shown to be a 
causal factor in moral exclusion as measured by the IEG in Study 2. Second, in Study 1, 
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perceived symbolic threat was shown to uniquely predict moral exclusion, even after 
accounting for prejudice, an effect was robust across both the IEG and LMES measures 
of moral exclusion. Other research has shown that perceived symbolic threat more con-
sistently predicted exclusionary attitudes than perceived realistic threat (Ariely, 2011). 
Clearly perceived symbolic threat is an important factor in moral exclusion, but symbol-
ic threat must be considered along with realistic threat when exploring the causes of 
moral exclusion. 
Study 2’s results provided support for the hypothesis that symbolic threat is a 
causal factor in moral exclusion. The failure to demonstrate a causal link between realis-
tic threat and moral exclusion was unexpected. Because of prevailing political rhetoric 
and media coverage of immigration issues that focuses on the threat Mexican immi-
grants have to the economy, realistic threat may be so strongly associated with Mexican 
immigrants in the minds of the participants that it is a stronger and relatively automatic 
reaction in absence of any eliciting stimulus. Thus it is more difficult to affect perceived 
realistic threat in the minds of participants. But, when presented with a newspaper arti-
cle about the symbolic threat represented by Mexican immigration (in the two condi-
tions explicitly discussing this threat), participants who might not previously have rec-
ognized symbolic threat then begin to consider the symbolic threat posed by Mexican 
immigrants. This novel consideration may cause the effect of symbolic threat to emerge. 
In other words, Study 2’s fictitious newspaper articles may have provided an oppor-
tunity for symbolic threats to be perceived more strongly by participants, and the effect 
to emerge, whereas their realistic threat perception might have been relatively impervi-
ous to manipulation. 
In addition, both Study 1 and Study 2 gave evidence for the importance of preju-
dice as a predictor of moral exclusion. Prejudice toward the outgroups in Study 1 was 
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shown to be strongly associated with moral exclusion, but after accounting for preju-
dice, perceived symbolic and realistic threats were shown to uniquely predict moral ex-
clusion scores. ITT proposes that perceived realistic and symbolic threats cause preju-
dice (Stephan et al., 2009), so it is possible that prejudice might mediate the relationship 
between symbolic threat and moral exclusion. However, in Study 2, symbolic threat 
was not shown to predict prejudice, so there is no evidence of prejudice mediating the 
relationship between symbolic threat and moral exclusion. These results indicate that 
while prejudice is a potent factor in moral exclusion, the influences of realistic and sym-
bolic threat are each important contributors to moral exclusion, over and above the in-
fluence of prejudice. 
It was also shown in Study 2 that the overall IEG score for all immigrant out-
groups was affected by the symbolic threat manipulation. The symbolic threat manipu-
lation used Mexican immigrants as the target group, so it might be expected that the 
IEG (Mexican only) would be affected, whereas the overall IEG would not. Similarly, 
the LMES, which used Mexican immigrants as the target outgroup, should have been 
affected by the manipulation but it was not. However, this result indicates that percep-
tion of threat from one outgroup (Mexican immigrants) may affect the moral exclusion 
of other outgroups (immigrants from other countries). This finding may reflect a con-
traction of the scope of justice in the face of perceived threat as the moral community 
shrinks toward the ingroup. This is an important finding in scope of justice research 
that has not previously been explored and may point to the importance of underlying 
psychological processes such as social categorization and intergroup differentiation. 
Psychological Processes in Moral Exclusion 
The scope of justice is a psychological boundary that delineates between those 
inside and outside our moral community (Deutsch, 1974, 1985; Opotow, 1988, 1990a, 
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1990b), and thus categorizes those whom are included and excluded. This boundary 
might expand and contract in response to situational factors such as intergroup threat 
(Deutsch, 2006). The contraction of the boundary may mean that outgroups other than 
the outgroup that directly poses the perceived threat may also be subject to moral ex-
clusion, as the scope of justice contracts across the entire moral universe. For example, 
threat posed to America by Islamic terrorists who are also immigrants might cause an 
American’s scope of justice to contract so that all immigrant outgroups are subject to 
greater moral exclusion. In fact, shortly after the September 11th, 2001 Al-Qaida attacks 
on the United States, public opinion in the United States and Canada advocated greater 
restriction of immigration than before the attacks, and web sites advocating immigra-
tion restriction linked immigration policy to the terrorist attacks, describing the symbol-
ic and realistic threats represented by immigrants (Esses, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2002). 
This contraction of the scope of justice as a product of threat may reflect an un-
derlying social categorization process (Oakes, 1996) whereby the context of intergroup 
threat increases the perception of intergroup differences, making ingroup social identity 
more salient and leading to depersonalization and the emergence of group-based atti-
tudes and behavior. For the example above, in the absence of terrorist threat, immi-
grants may be perceived at a more interpersonal level, but as threat increases, social cat-
egorization depersonalizes the individual, leading to group identity and perception of 
group-based threat. The scope of justice boundary may then be drawn closer to the in-
group, resulting in outgroups other than terrorist groups, such as immigrant outgroups, 
becoming more excluded from the scope of justice. This social categorization—moral 
exclusion process is a “policing of intergroup boundaries” (Stephan et al., 2009, p. 52), 
which is proposed to arise as a response to intergroup threat. Further studies might 
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help understand whether and how the effect of symbolic and realistic threats from one 
outgroup generalize to other outgroups through the contraction of the scope of justice, 
and how the contraction of the scope of justice in response to intergroup threat is un-
derpinned by social categorization processes. 
Measurement of Moral Exclusion 
Despite more than two decades of research on moral exclusion and the scope of 
justice, few measures of the construct exist. Recently, Passini and Morselli (2011) devel-
oped and validated a moral inclusion/exclusion scale—the Inclusion/Exclusion of Oth-
er Groups (IEG) scale. The scale has been validated in U.S. and Italian populations 
(Leighton et al., 2012) but has thus far been used only in correlational studies. The pre-
sent research used this scale to measure moral exclusion in an experimental manipula-
tion paradigm for the first time. IEG was shown to be predicted by perceived symbolic 
and realistic threats, in accord with ITT, and the IEG scores were affected in the ex-
pected way by experimentally induced symbolic threat. This provides further valida-
tion of this instrument as a measure of moral exclusion. 
The development of a new measure of moral exclusion for the present study was 
important to provide for the inclusion of two new constructs as part of moral exclu-
sion—social centrality and social capital—while incorporating classic aspects of moral 
exclusion delineated by Opotow: allocation of resources to the outgroup, self-sacrifice 
for the welfare of the outgroup, and consideration of fairness for the outgroup (Opotow, 
1990b). While Opotow’s classic factors in moral exclusion are important, the concepts of 
social centrality and social capital capture important aspects of intergroup dynamics in 
social systems: political and economic power and interdependence. These aspects are 
important for the full inclusion of marginalized outgroups in the moral community and 
are crucial for outgroups to effect social change leading to a more inclusive, sustainable 
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society (cf. Diani, 1997; Gittell, Ortega-Bustamante, & Steffy, 2000; Subasic, Reynolds, & 
Turner, 2008; Szreter, 2002). 
It was unexpected that the LMES was less sensitive to the effect of prejudice rela-
tive to the IEG. On cursory inspection, it appears that the IEG may tap more affective 
responses through statements such as “members of this group deserve no respect” and 
“members of this group are extremely uncivilized.” In contrast, the LMES may tap more 
cognitive aspects of intergroup attitudes through statements such as “it’s okay that 
members of this group think they are being taken advantage of” and “safety and securi-
ty of this group is a good use of our public resources.” Thus, the IEG’s more affectively 
loaded statements may tap the more affective aspects of prejudice, whereas the LMES 
does not. An avenue of research could study the degree to which each measure is relat-
ed to group-based emotions (Miller et al., 2004) and how these emotions differentially 
affect responses on each measure. 
The LMES was shown to be predicted by prejudice, symbolic threat, and realistic 
threat similarly to the IEG, but it was also less sensitive to effects from general prejudice 
relative to intergroup threats. Thus it may be a useful instrument for delineating moral 
exclusion in the context of intergroup threat by reducing the effect that general preju-
dice might play. A full analysis of reliability and validity is outside the scope of the pre-
sent research, but additional studies using this instrument will be conducted to further 
establish its psychometric properties. 
Future Steps for Research 
The present studies are helpful in explicating the relationships between moral 
exclusion and symbolic and realistic threat. There are numerous paths to take with this 
research, and I will focus here on just a few. 
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First, the present studies failed to elicit realistic threat, so the predictions of the 
ITT have not been fully tested. The use of Mexican immigrants as the target group, an 
immigrant outgroup well established in the minds of participants, might have restricted 
the variability obtained with the realistic threat manipulation, because participants 
might have come to the experiment with already-formed associations between Mexican 
immigrants and perceived realistic threat. To make it more likely that the symbolic and 
realistic threat manipulations would elicit the desired threat perceptions, it may be nec-
essary to use a novel outgroup with which participants have no experience, a method 
that has been used successfully in previous studies on intergroup threat and attitudes 
toward immigrants (e.g., Esses et al., 1998; Stephan et al., 2005). For example, a future 
study could use a novel immigrant group, described as being resettled into the local ar-
ea in large numbers as part of a refugee relocation program, as the target group. In this 
case, participants’ perceptions of this outgroup might be more malleable and more re-
sponsive to the threat manipulations than they were in Study 2, which used an out-
group that was likely to elicit preexisting realistic threat associations. 
Second, this research is limited to self-report of moral exclusion. No research to 
date has used the moral exclusion scales (IEG or LMES) to predict behavioral outcomes. 
Extending moral exclusion research to behavioral intentions or actual behaviors is im-
portant to ensure that the measures we are using are ecologically valid. Behavioral in-
tentions are good predictors of behavioral outcomes across a broad array of behavioral 
domains (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005), so measurement of moral exclusion toward an out-
groups and behavioral intentions to help that outgroup attain greater access to re-
sources and other social goods would be a good beginning to understanding the poten-
tial predictive power of moral exclusion on behaviors toward the outgroups. This re-
search has already been done using non-human analogues (Opotow, 1995), but exten-
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sions to human outgroups would be valuable. For example, an experiment might meas-
ure moral exclusion toward an outgroup such as homosexuals or drug addicts and pre-
sent participants with an opportunity to donate money or time to a group working to 
help the outgroup. The resulting relationship between moral exclusion and behavioral 
intentions would give preliminary evidence of moral exclusion as a predictor of behav-
iors. 
Third, research is still lacking in understanding the basic psychological processes 
underlying the effects of intergroup threat on moral exclusion. Is it, for example, neces-
sary that the threat is perceived to be posed by an outgroup? Perhaps moral exclusion 
of an outgroup could be increased even in the context of more generalized threats. Ex-
periments could test the effects of interpersonal threat versus intergroup threat. It may 
be the case that any generalized systemic arousal increases moral exclusion; might sys-
temic arousal mediate the effect of intergroup threats? 
Experiments to discover whether the effects of threat on moral exclusion are me-
diated by social categorization and delegitimization (cf. Bar-Tal, 1989; Wenzel, 2009) 
could help better understand how moral exclusion emerges in the context of intergroup 
threat. Another basic process that may be useful to understand is what role emotions, 
particularly disgust, contempt, and fear, have in dehumanization and moral exclusion 
in response to intergroup threats (cf. Harris & Fiske, 2006). It may be that the negative 
affect aroused by intergroup threat mediates threat’s effects on moral exclusion. If it is 
the case that generalized systemic arousal leads to greater moral exclusion, inducing 
extreme positive affect may also result in moral exclusion. 
Practical implications 
Moral exclusion is a serious problem in societies because it has the potential to 
lead to structural and direct violence, usually by a dominant majority against a margin-
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alized minority. In the current studies, moral exclusion of immigrants, particularly Mex-
ican immigrants, was the focus. This topic has immediate practical relevance because of 
vigorous immigration policy debate that has been ongoing in the United States and Eu-
rope for at least the last two decades. 
In 2010 Arizona’s legislature enacted laws that required police officers to de-
mand proof of citizenship from those who they suspected of being in the country with-
out authorization. Since then, legislatures in five more U.S. states have passed laws re-
stricting the participation in civil society of undocumented nationals, and these laws 
have especially affected Mexican immigrants. These laws allow the state to deprive in-
dividuals of utility service and access to higher education, to invalidate business con-
tracts, and to prohibit them from business transactions with government agencies; these 
laws also permit authorities to stop, search, and detain individuals whom authorities 
have a “reasonable suspicion” of being in the U.S. without authorization (Gomez, 2011; 
Preston, 2011a; Savage & Williams, 2011).  
In an interesting creation of a sub-group of morally excluded individuals, South 
Carolina’s legislature exempted maids, fishermen, and farm laborers from being subject 
to verification of immigration status by employers (Phillips, 2012). Consequently, em-
ployers are relieved of the worry that they are hiring unauthorized immigrants to work 
in potentially exploitative, strenuous, low-wage jobs. The immigrants then exist at the 
margins of the society, without access to political or economic power, without the secu-
rity of citizenship, and always prone to deportation if they are otherwise detected. The-
se laws are a form of structural violence against these undocumented immigrants and 
are at the core of moral exclusion: denial of considerations of fairness, access to re-
sources, refusal to make sacrifices for their welfare, and lack of social centrality and so-
cial capital. 
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The present research shows that perceived cultural and economic threats are fac-
tors in the moral exclusion of an immigrant outgroup. These perceived threats are po-
tent antecedents to the moral exclusion of immigrants, and a behavioral outcome may 
be seen in the immigration laws that are currently being enacted by states. Statements of 
legislators in states where harsh anti-immigration laws have been passed or proposed 
provides evidence of perceived threat around the issue of immigration. The sponsor of 
Arizona’s immigration legislation recently testified in a U.S. Senate committee hearing 
that “the invasion of illegal aliens we face today…pose[s] one of the greatest threats to 
our nation in terms of political, economic and national security” (Litvan, 2012). State 
legislators from Pennsylvania and South Carolina cited the dire effects undocumented 
immigrants had on state budgets, referring to the “illegal alien invasion,” as a “malady 
of epic proportions” (Preston, 2011b). An Alabama state senator, referring to the way 
Southerners take extreme measures in the face of threat, advised fellow legislators to 
“empty the clip and do what has to be done” to pass strict immigration laws (Rolley, 
2011). 
This research contributes to an understanding of the psychological processes that 
legislators might be using when forming these kinds of exclusionary laws and that citi-
zens use when considering supporting them. When legislators and citizens see threats 
posed by an outgroup to their values, morals, resources, and well-being, it sets the stage 
for moral exclusion of the outgroup, moving them outside the scope of justice. Once 
moved outside the scope of justice, structural violence through marginalization, delegit-
imization, and even direct violence can be justified and enacted. Understanding the 
formation of the scope of justice and the dynamics of its contraction and expansion is 
imperative for building sustainable, peaceful, inclusive societies and institutions. 
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Footnotes  
 
1 A full description of the “racialization” of Rwanda is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. For example, it is interesting to note that it did not originate with the 
Rwandans themselves; the national ID cards which specified the ethnic constitution of 
each individual were originated by Rwanda’s Belgian colonizers as an administrative 
aid. See Eltringham (2004) for a complete description 
2 One study used economic threat along with percent of immigrants from non-
Western countries as predictors of prejudice (Quillian, 1995). It is unclear what this per-
centage represents in terms of threat. That is, does the percentage represent a symbolic 
threat through dilution of the ingroup’s cultural values, or an economic threat through 
the greater competition for jobs and other resources? 
3 Following the predictor variables, the packet contained questionnaires which 
assessed group identification as “Americans” and “world citizens” (adapted from Leach 
et al., 2008), Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), 
and Right Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996). Because these variables are not of 
interest in the present study and their measurement followed the predictor variables, 
their data will not be analyzed or discussed. 
4 Although there was no a priori hypothesis about any interactive effects of sym-
bolic and realistic threats on moral exclusion, the interaction term was entered in Step 3 
to explore the possibility of such effects. 
5 Some wording for the articles was based on content found on the following 
immigration-related web sites: http://www.fairus.org, http://www.azcentral.com, 
http://www.mdcathcon.org 
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6 Following the primary dependent variables, the packet contained question-
naires that assessed group identification as “Americans” and “world citizens” (adapted 
from Leach et al., 2008), Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), and Right 
Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996). Since these variables are not of interest in the 
present studies and their measurement followed the dependent variables of interest, 
their data will not be analyzed or discussed. 
7 Because the ANOVA for IEG indicted no main effect of realistic threat or an in-
teraction effect, a test of the mediation of realistic threat’s effects on IEG by prejudice 
was not done. Similarly, the ANOVA for IEG (Mexican only) and LMES showed no sig-
nificant main or interaction effects, so mediation analyses were not performed for these 
variables. 
8 The four newspapers were the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street 
Journal, and USA Today. 
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Appendix A 
 
The Symbolic Threat scale. 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate how much you agree with the statement. Please 
provide a rating from 1 to 7, using the following scale: 
 
 1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
 Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither Agree Slightly Moderately Strongly 
 Disagree Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree Agree 
 
____ 1. Mexican immigrants should learn to conform to the rules and norms of Ameri-
can society as soon as possible after they arrive. 
____ 2. Immigration from Mexico is undermining American culture. 
____ 3. The values and beliefs of Mexican immigrants regarding work are basically 
quite similar to those of most Americans. 
____ 4. The values and beliefs of Mexican immigrants regarding moral and religious 
issues are not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans. 
____ 5. The values and beliefs of Mexican immigrants regarding family issues and so-
cializing children are basically quite similar to those of most Americans. 
____ 6. The values and beliefs of Mexican immigrants regarding social relations are 
not compatible with the beliefs and values of most Americans. 
____ 7. Mexican immigrants should not have to accept American ways. 
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Appendix B 
 
The Realistic Threat scale. 
 
For each of the following statements, please indicate how much you agree with the statement. Please 
provide a rating from 1 to 7, using the following scale: 
 
 1 2 3 4 5  6 7 
 Strongly Moderately Slightly Neither Agree Slightly Moderately Strongly 
 Disagree Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree Agree 
 
____ 1. Mexican immigrants get more from this country than they contribute. 
____ 2. The children of Mexican immigrants should have the same right to attend pub-
lic schools in the United States as Americans do. 
____ 3. Mexican immigration has increased the tax burden on Americans.  
____ 4. Mexican immigrants are not displacing American workers from their jobs.  
____ 5. Mexican immigrants should be eligible for the same health-care benefits re-
ceived by Americans.  
____ 6. Social services have become less available to Americans because of Mexican 
immigration.  
____ 7. The quality of social services available to Americans has remained the same, 
despite Mexican immigration.  
____ 8. Mexican immigrants are as entitled to subsidized housing or subsidized utili-
ties (water, sewage, electricity) as poor Americans are. 
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Appendix C 
 
The Inclusion/Exclusion of other Groups (IEG) scale. 
 
 
For each group, please indicate which of the two statements best describes your opinion? 
Put an X on the number, considering that +3 on the left means you completely agree with the statement on the 
left, and +3 on the right means you completely agree with the statement on the right. 
(Put only one X for each row/group)
For instance, if you quite agree with the statement on the left, put the X in this way:
 
Statement on the left Statement on the right
Group 1 +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Instead, if you completely agree with the statement on the right, put the X in this way:
Group 2 +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Values held by this group represent 
a threat to our well-being
Values held by this group represent 
an opportunity for our well-being
French immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Mexican immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Canadian immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Korean immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Italian immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Chinese immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Members of this group deserve 
no respect
Members of this group deserve our 
utmost respect
French immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Mexican immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Canadian immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Korean immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Italian immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Chinese immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
It is necessary to avoid any kind of 
contact with members of this group
It is necessary for all of us to 
engage in establishing constructive 
contacts with this group's members
French immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Mexican immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Canadian immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Korean immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Italian immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Chinese immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
!
!
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Instructions reminder:
For instance, if you quite agree with the statement on the left, put the X in this way:
 
Statement on the left Statement on the right
Group 1 +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Instead, if you completely agree with the statement on the right, put the X in this way:
Group 2 +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3!
!
I think that members of this group 
of people are extremely uncivilized.
I think that members of this group 
of people are extremely civilized
French immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Mexican immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Canadian immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Korean immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Italian immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Chinese immigrants +3 +2 +1 0 +1 +2 +3
Feeling Thermometer
Please indicate your feeling toward the group below, as a number of degrees along a 
thermometer of feeling, from cold to warm:
0°! 10°! 20°! 30°! 40°! 50°! 60°! 70°! 80°! 90°! 100°
Very Cold Feeling! ! ! ! ! !     Very Warm Feeling
My feeling toward French immigrants: _______ degrees
My feeling toward Mexican immigrants: _______ degrees
My feeling toward Canadian immigrants: _______ degrees
My feeling toward Korean immigrants: _______ degrees
My feeling toward Italian immigrants: _______ degrees
My feeling toward Chinese immigrants: _______ degrees
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Appendix D 
 
Leighton Moral Exclusion Scale (LMES). 
 
A new scale developed to measure moral exclusion, including social capital and social 
centrality as elements of the scope of justice, using a 7-point Likert-type response for-
mat, anchored with “disagree strongly” and “agree strongly.” Reversed items marked 
with asterisk. Parenthetical headings not included in scale as administered. Items in-
cluded in this scale: 
(Social centrality) 
“Mexican immigrants should not be elected to city, county, and state public offices.” * 
“I think Mexican immigrants should have access to bank loans to start businesses.” 
“I would be opposed to having more Mexican immigrants as business leaders, such as Chief Executive 
Officers.” * 
“We should fund programs to help Mexican immigrants purchase homes in residential areas where they 
are underrepresented” 
“I would be opposed to Mexican immigrants having a community festival on the Fayetteville town 
square.” * 
(Social Capital) 
“We should do more to inform Mexican immigrants about American culture, and also inform Americans 
about Mexican immigrant culture.” 
“We don’t need to make sure Mexican immigrants know about job openings in business and public agen-
cies.” * 
“We should help Mexican immigrants join political parties and form political groups.” 
“I would trust a police officer who is a Mexican immigrant.” 
“I would trust a professor who is a Mexican immigrant.” 
(Allocating resources) 
“Our community should use resources for leisure facilities in areas with large Mexican immigrant popu-
lations” 
“Our community resources shouldn’t be used for the health of Mexican immigrants.” * 
“Safety and security of Mexican immigrants is a good use of our public resources.” 
“Education for Mexican immigrants is a good use of our public money.” 
“Allocating public resources to expand work and business opportunities for Mexican immigrants is not a 
good idea.” *  
(Sacrifice for well-being) 
“We should help Mexican immigrants who don’t have enough food, even if it means we have to give up 
something we need.” 
“I think we need to make sacrifices if it means Mexican immigrants would feel safe and secure.” 
“It is completely unacceptable to forego our own needs to foster the well-being of Mexican immigrants.” * 
(Considerations of fairness) 
“It is okay if Mexican immigrants think they are being taken advantage of.” * 
“Mexican immigrants should never be forced to give into our demands.” 
“We need to ensure we don’t exploit Mexican immigrants.” 
“Mexican immigrants should have no choice but do what we want them to do.” * 
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Appendix E. 
 
Demographic Information Questionnaire. 
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Appendix F 
 
Stimulus Material Wording: 
Realistic Threat Present, Symbolic Threat Absent Condition. 
 
Experts on immigration today released a report detailing how federal, state, and 
local finances and labor markets are being threatened by Mexican immigration. The Na-
tional Commission on Immigration, formed by a congressional mandate in 2011, is 
made up of non-partisan experts from industry, academia, and government. 
Walter Kemp, the commission’s chairman, is a nationally-recognized expert who 
has studied immigration while on the faculty of Harvard University, and is now an ad-
visor to the Congress and President Obama. The impact on America’s economy and the 
well-being of its citizens because of Mexican immigrants, both documented and “ille-
gal,” is “unprecedented in its scope,” he wrote in the report’s introduction, “and the 
threat this represents is important for all Americans to understand to help protect the 
American economy.”  
The report notes that Mexican immigration is a drain on the national economy, as 
estimated at $67–87 billion per year. At the local level, Mexican immigration costs the 
taxpayers over $24 billion a year in education costs, and the influx of immigrants into 
schools also creates a burden for teachers, negatively impacting the education of non-
immigrant students. 
At the state level, state universities are also feeling the weight of Mexican immi-
gration. In the report, experts estimate that even current students are impacted, as en-
rollment of Mexican immigrants into universities has gone up. Students are seeing few-
er available classes, larger class sizes, and increasing tuition costs. At the same time, 
scholarships are becoming smaller and harder to get as Mexican immigrants are award-
ed scholarships over native students. The report points out that these effects are all di-
rectly tied to the rapidly increasing influx of Mexican immigration, and will increase in 
severity over the coming years. 
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Appendix G 
 
Stimulus Material Wording: 
Symbolic Threat Present, Realistic Threat Absent Condition. 
 
Experts on immigration today released a report detailing how cultural values, tra-
ditions, and beliefs that have been characteristic of Americans for the last 200 years are 
changing as a consequence of Mexican immigration. The National Commission on Im-
migration, formed by a congressional mandate in 2011, is made up of non-partisan ex-
perts from industry, academia, and government. 
Walter Kemp, the commission’s chairman, is a nationally-recognized expert who 
has studied immigration while on the faculty of Harvard University, and is now an ad-
visor to the Congress and President Obama. The impact on American culture, values, 
and traditions because of Mexican immigrants, both documented and “illegal,” are 
“unprecedented in their scope,” he wrote in the report’s introduction, “and the threat 
this represents is important for all Americans to understand to help preserve American 
cultural values and traditions.” 
Immigrants from Mexico are threatening American culture by replacing the Eng-
lish language and American symbols of identity, and Spanish is now replacing English 
everywhere from colleges to churches. The report points out that for the first time in 
U.S. history, half of those entering the United States speak a single non-English lan-
guage. 
“Education is changing fundamentally, from K-12 to universities,” Kemp writes, 
as schools are increasingly becoming bilingual and bicultural. As their numbers in-
crease, Mexican immigrants become more committed to their own ethnic identity and 
culture, and are forcing changes to the culture of academia and disrupting its traditions 
and values. For example, many universities are adopting new rules that require athletic 
events to celebrate the contributions of Mexican immigrant student athletes. Other hon-
ored traditions such as marching bands or patriotic celebrations are often eliminated to 
accommodate these new events. The report points out that these effects are all directly 
tied to the rapidly increasing influx of Mexican immigration, and will increase in severi-
ty over the coming years. 
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Appendix H 
 
Stimulus Material Wording: 
Symbolic Threat Present, Realistic Threat Present Condition. 
 
Experts on immigration today released a report detailing how American culture 
and economy is threatened by Mexican immigration. The National Commission on Im-
migration, formed by a congressional mandate in 2011, is made up of non-partisan ex-
perts from industry, academia, and government. 
Walter Kemp, the commission’s chairman, is a nationally-recognized expert who 
has studied immigration while on the faculty of Harvard University, and is now an ad-
visor to the Congress and President Obama. The impact on America’s economy and cul-
ture because of Mexican immigrants, both documented and “illegal,” is “unprecedented 
in its scope,” he wrote in the report’s introduction, “and the threat this represents is im-
portant for all Americans to understand to help protect American culture and the 
American economy.”  
Immigrants from Mexico are threatening American culture by replacing the Eng-
lish language and American symbols of identity. “Education is changing fundamental-
ly, from K-12 to universities,” Kemp writes. As their numbers increase, Mexican immi-
grants are forcing changes to the culture of academia and disrupting its traditions and 
values. For example, many universities are adopting new rules that require athletic 
events to celebrate the contributions of Mexican immigrant student athletes. Other hon-
ored traditions such as marching bands or patriotic celebrations are often eliminated to 
accommodate these new events. 
The report notes that Mexican immigration is a drain on the national economy, as 
estimated at $67–87 billion per year. At the local level, the influx of immigrants into 
schools also creates a burden for teachers, negatively impacting the education of non-
immigrant students. The report notes that as enrollment of Mexican immigrants into 
universities has gone up, current students are seeing fewer available classes, larger class 
sizes, and increasing tuition costs, while scholarships are smaller and harder to get as 
Mexican immigrants are awarded scholarships over native students. 
The report points out that these effects on American culture and economic well-
being are directly tied to the rapidly increasing influx of Mexican immigration, and will 
increase in severity over the coming years. 
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Appendix I 
 
Stimulus Material Wording: 
Symbolic Threat Absent, Realistic Threat Absent Condition. 
 
Experts on immigration today released a report detailing the significant financial 
and personal costs immigrants from Mexico face, whether they immigrate through offi-
cial channels or through crossing the border without authorization. The National 
Commission on Immigration, formed by a congressional mandate in 2011, is made up of 
non-partisan experts from industry, academia, and government. 
Walter Kemp, who chairs the commission, is a nationally-recognized expert who 
has studied immigration while on the faculty of Harvard University, and is now an ad-
visor with congress and President Obama. The problems faced by immigrants, both 
documented and “illegal,” are “unprecedented in their scope,” he wrote in the report’s 
introduction, “and are important for all Americans to understand.” 
Legal immigration requires an immigrant visa, which is usually obtained through 
sponsorship of family members or employers, but can be obtained because the immi-
grant is fleeing persecution, or through a lottery. In terms of Mexican immigrants, visas 
sponsored by a family member or employer often takes 8-10 years to obtain because of 
low availability and high demand. Persecution is very hard to prove, and Mexicans are 
excluded from the lottery. Thus, some Mexican immigrants choose to risk crossing the 
border without authorization. 
The financial and personal costs of crossing without authorization are steep. Illegal 
border crossings are controlled by a cartel of “coyotes,” who smuggle the immigrant 
across the border through routes they have established. The coyotes charge $3,000 to 
$5,000 per person who crosses, an amount that represents several years of income in ru-
ral Mexico. 
  
